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This study provides a descriptive analysis of South Africa's response to the emerging 
global information policy regime. Compelled by a combination of hegemonic influences 
and its own self interest, this study argues that South Africa accepted the liberalising 
commitments of the emerging global infonnation policy regime vis-a-vis the World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. As a contribution to 
understanding inter-state cooperation in international relations, regime theory is utilised 
as the theoretical framework. The regime framework is used to explain the motivations 
behind South Africa's intention to liberalise its telecommunications sector as a result of 
power dynamics in the international system. The findings from the qualititative analysis 
note that South Africa's response is motivated by systemic and domestic factors. A 
willingness to enter the information economy and fulfil domestic social development 
means that South Africa has to balance its obligations to the WTO with the commitments 
to improve its domestic accessibility concerns. As a developing country with inadequate 
conditions for liberalisation, South Africa was unable to stop the strategic equity partners 
from capitalising on the poorly regulated telecommunications environment. The 
unfavourable result of high tariff charges and low fixed-line connectivity can be 
attributed to privatisation initiatives and lack of political will to promote competition. 
South Africa is in the midst of dramatic change in its telecommunications sector which is 
aided by technological convergence, further privatisation of the incumbent and the 










means that liberalisation is part of South Africa's broader commitments to the emerging 
global infonnation policy regime. Entering the information economy is conditional on the 
successful implementation of international liberalisation policies so that the required 
investment and skills can assist in providing universal service to the majority of South 
Africa citizens. However, implementation requires a fair market structure, independent 
regulation and low interconnection charges. Without these important structures in place, 
this study notes that the goal of participation in the infonnation economy and economic 
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, . D 
INTRODUCTION 
The accelerated pace with which technology has progressed in recent history has been 
demonstrated by the rise of a "network society"]. This society has encapsulated many 
related phenomena ranging from urban migration to instantaneous financial transactions 
from one part of the globe to another. It is difficult to ignore the way the world is 
changing. On a political terrain, the implication of technological innovation has arguably 
re-arranged the rules of engagement between different states. For political scholars and 
theorists alike, the debates between realism and liberalism within international relations 
are brought to the fore with the renewed focus on technological development. By 
conceptualising these two theories in an international political economy perspective, it is 
useful to note that the role of the state in realist terms seeks to maximise its power and 
international standing vis-a.-vis other states. Through hegemony, powerful states are able 
to exert their influence over weaker states and create rules in the international system. In 
contrast, liberalism envisions a global marketplace in which open markets and the 
movement of capital detennine the policies of governments. A globalising international 
environment and the rapid innovation of technology has forced states to create a global 
regulatory framework with shared norms and practices that will concentrate the flows of 
information through governable structures. It is this global regulatory framework that this 
study will investigate. 
From domestic politics to multilateral negotiations, Information and Communication 
Technology (lCT) has become an important sector in policy formulation and the 
functioning of the neoliberal political economy. This study will examine a specific aspect 
within this broad trend by providing an analysis of the "emerging global information 
I "A network society is a society where the key social structures and activities are organized around 
electronically processed information networks. So it's not just about networks or social networks, because 
social networks have been very old forms of social organization. It's about social networks which process 
and manage information and are using micro-electronic based technologies." This definition came from 
Manuel Castells when interviewed by Harry Kiesler, University of Berkeley, for the "Conservations with 
History" series in 2001. The full interview is available on 










policy regime" (emerging GIP regime). The case-study used in this analysis occupies an 
important place in international relations literature as it accounts for the ways states are 
interacting through global governance in a system of sovereign nation states. The 
importance of cooperation is crucial as regimes foster rule-governed activity within the 
international system. Sovereign nation-states have demonstrated the utility of a rule-
based system of cooperation through international regimes which create nonns, rules and 
principles for specific issue-areas in the global system such as nuclear weapons, 
environmental issues and international shipping. 
However, these rules are not always conditioned for the range of states that enforce them 
as domestic concerns have to be weighed against international commitments. In the case 
of ICT, a global regulatory framework had to be flexible enough to encourage developing 
and developed countries to join without compromising the national sovereignty of policy-
makers and provide a set of rules and regulations that fully utilised this dynamic tool. 
This task is best understood as having been processed through the emerging global 
infonnation policy (GIP) regime. To understand how these challenges interrelate in 
assessing South Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime, the following outline 
narrows down the study into specific theoretical borders and important international 
agreements. 
1.1 - General Overview ofthe Study 
The following study will provide a thorough analysis of the emerging GIP regime by 
discussing its composition, theoretical boundaries and current operation. By 
incorporating a case-study, this study will discuss South Africa's response to the 
emerging GIP regime's principles, nonns and practices. The temporal examination will 
explore ICT governance2 and policy fonnulation in the infonnation economy by 
discussing the shift from the old international telecommunications regime3 to the 
2 Braman, Sandra (ed.) (2004) The Emergent Global Information Policy Regime (New York: Pal grave 
Macmillan) defines governance as the formal and informal institutions, rules, agreements, and practices of 
state and non-state actors the decisions and behaviours of which have an impact on society. 
3 Cowhey, P. F. (1990) 'The International Telecommunications Regime: The Political Roots of Regimes 
for High Technology'. International Organization, 45 (2): 169-99 notes "the international 











operationalisation of the emerging GIP regime. Based predominantly on the consultations 
between the World Trade Organisation (WTO) members in the mid-nineties, the 
emerging GIP regime has a departure point that correlates with the 1997 WTO 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications4 . More commonly known as the GATS 
[General Agreement on Telecommunications] Fourth Protocol, "this agreement is the 
product of efforts by members of the WTO to introduce global competition in basic 
telecommunications services."s Although deliberations at the WTO signalled the 
concerted effort by member countries to liberalise their respective telecoms sectors, the 
move toward ending monopoly-run telecom industries dated back to the 1970s. Having 
been a founding member of the WTO and signatory of the GATS specific commitments 
in 1994, South Africa has had to align its telecommunication policy with the 
requirements of the GATS Fourth Protocol. South Africa's commitments largely 
reflected a general global tendency toward liberalisation through the opening of cellular 
and satellite services as well as ending Telkom's fixed-line monopoly by 2003. The 
partial privatization of Telkom as well as Ministerial intervention in the regulator'S 
activities is just two events that demonstrate the domestic implications of adopting the 
Fourth Protocol. Tensions surrounding compliance have created an interesting debate 
between competing domestic policy goals and international trade objectives which is the 
focus of chapter four. 
These events and debates are part of a broader governing system that influences the 
fonnulation of policy in a domestic context. The influences of the emerging GIP regime 
stem primarily from two approaches that are dealt with later in this chapter but require a 
brief explanation here. The two approaches are separate analytical tools that help explain 
how leT policy is developed in a domestic context. One approach is rooted in social 
bilateral agreements in the global market and thereby created one of the most lucrative and technologically 
significant international cartels in history." 
4 "This was one series of negotiations which followed the Uruguay Round. Through global liberalization of 
the basic telecommunications services such as voice telephone services, it aimed at the introduction of 
competition, the reduction of service rates, and diversification of services." Sourced from 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/johotsusinlwhatsnew/wtoagree-e.html(accessed 2 August 2007) 
5 Cohen, Tracy (2001) "Domestic Policy and South Africa's Commitments under the WTO's Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement: Explaining the Apparent Inertia" in Journal of International Economic 











welfare projects such as developing tele-centres and distance learning while the other 
promotes the interests of business and foreign investment. Each approach has its own set 
of organisations and agreements that emphasise how ICT could be used to develop a 
social welfare agenda or electronic commerce (see Figure 1). 
As a contribution to the literature on ICT in international relations, this study will 
synthesise a significant amount of the literature already compiled on the topic and supply 
an analysis that investigates South Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime. The 
literature on the emerging GIP regime has increased significantly over the past few years 
in areas such as e-commerce and intellectual property rights. To avoid a vague debate on 
the numerous factors that make-up the emerging GIP regime, this study will concentrate 
on South Africa's response to the WTO liberalisation agreements within the emerging 
GIP regime. 
From an international political economy perspective, this study is finnly located in the 
neoliberal6 environment of international trade liberalisation and privatisation as described 
by Williamson (2002). Coupled with the process of economic globalisation, the decision-
making capacity of the state has become somewhat blurred with the advent of fast 
moving capital and powerful multinational corporations. However, cooperation between 
states has increased significantly given the collaboration needed in a liberalised trading 
environment in areas such as import tariffs. International governance structures, such as 
the General Agreement in Trade and Services, have therefore had to adjust to rapid 
changes in technology as well as an open-market system. Having had ICT assist in the 
fast transmission of infonnation amongst markets around the world, the neoliberal era is 
the appropriate setting for a study in collective action among states and the subsequent 
6 An explanation of the neoliberal environment is best summed up in John Williamson's "Washington 
Consensus". Drafted by Williamson in specific regard for a development strategy for Latin America, it 
soon became a steadfast set of policies advocated by the US Treasury, World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (lMF). It clearly encapsulated the neo-liberal agenda - its antecedents being the free-market 
and comparative advantage theories of Adam Smith and David Ricardo respectively - and became the 
universal growth strategy. Williamson (2002) notes: "The three big ideas ... are macroeconomic discipline, a 
market economy, and openness to the world (at least in respect of trade and FDI).,,6 - Williamson, John., 
(2002) "Did the Washington Consensus Fail?" Speech for the Institute oflnternational Economics, 











power relations among those structures. The study of the emerging GIP regime and South 
Africa's response requires a theory that keeps the debate within specific theoretical 
borders. At the macro, micro and meso-level, the use of regime theory facilitates the most 
useful discussion on international actors and domestic policy formulation. 
Regime theory provides the appropriate theoretical framework as is demonstrated through 
the course of this study. As Braman (2004) highlights: "The regime approach to global 
infonnation policy has utility because it offers a heuristic that helps identify common 
trends in phenomena and processes scattered across policy arenas historically treated as 
analytically distinct. .. 1t addresses one of the key problems facing infonnation 
policymakers - the dispersal of decision making across numerous venues and players -
by envisioning a common universe."? The various arguments that follow in this study 
show that such an accomplishment is dependent on a number of variables that include 
collective decision-making and a level playing field to detennine the "rules of the game". 
These variables face obstacles for developing and developed states alike. Challenges 
include hegemonic states detennining the imperatives of the regime through international 
institutions and deadlocks at negotiating tables regarding accepted principles that all 
countries should follow. This study does not negate the role of the state and adopts a 
realist approach to interstate relations and within regimes. 
Figure I assists in illustrating the framework in which the emerging global infonnation 
policy regime affects South Africa. It displays the associations that South Africa has with 
the electronic commerce and social welfare approaches of the regime. The intent behind 
Figure I is to recognise that South Africa has a dual responsibility to both approaches and 
therefore finds itself balancing international trade commitments with domestic social 
welfare concerns. Since there has been a concentrated effort to conceptualise the impact 
of ICT in international relations, the literature is vast and has considered a variety of 
fields, actors and theories. The methodology outline, conceptualisations and literature 
review that follows has cleared the path for a concentrated effort that outlines relevant 
concepts and analytical tools. 











Figure 1 - South Africa's position in the emerging GlP regime 
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1.1.2 - Problem Statement 
Cogburn (2003) 8 provides a study that looks at the broader implications of the emerging 
GIP regime on developing countries and his study utilises international regime theory to 
discuss the problem of the growing split between two agendas - one rooted in electronic 
commerce and the other in social-welfare programs (see Figure 1). It is important to 
highlight that the two approaches are not as analytically distinct as Figure 1 suggests. 
There are many areas in which they overlap, but for the purposes of this study, an 
emphasis is put on the two separate directions that each approach would take the regime 
in. Whilst discussing the nature of the new regime, Cogburn notes a potential problem 
regarding the direction of the regime's interests: "One possibility is that a very broad 
regime could emerge representing a plethora of diverse societal stakeholders and actors 
and exploiting the applications and services of the Information Society. However, another 
possibility, perhaps a more likely one, is that corporate-oriented interests may dominate 
the emergent regime fonnation process and skew its development away from these broad 
societal perspectives, to a narrower regime focused on global electronic commerce.,,9 
This problem highlights the tensions that the emerging GIP regime faces as it deals with 
competing interests from developed and developing countries regarding the direction it 
will take. Cogburn (2004) emphasises the importance of the Global Infonnation Society 
(GIS) as a delivery platform for innovative applications such as telemedicine, distance 
learning and teleworking. For the purposes of this study, the role of epistemic 
communities JO as determining the power relations within the emerging GIP regime is 
vital to understanding the divergent interests of the GIS. Briefly, Cogburn (2004) divides 
the Global Information Infrastructure into two fields, one that emphasises the future of 
electronic commerce and trade (dominated by the Business Dialogue for Electronic 
Commerce and WTO) and the other being a more diffuse development oriented group 
(influential groupings include the International Telecommunications Union and various 
other UN branches). These stakeholders represent the tensions and debates within the 
8 Cogburn D. (2003) "Governing global infonnation and communications policy: 
Emergent regime fonnation and the impact on Africa" in Telecommunications Policy, 27, pgs. 125 - 153 
9 Ibid. pg. 137 
10 Baylis, 1. and Smith, S. (eds.) (2001) The Globalization of World Politics, Second-edition, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) pg. 411 briefly define epistemic communities as: "Knowledge-based transnational 
communities of experts with shared understandings of an issue or problem or preferred policy responses." 










emerging GIP regime on various issues that will be explored later on. For South Africa, 
these competing interests present a serious dilemma as its telecommunication policy has 
had to negotiate the country's social welfare ambitions along with corporate interests and 
vice versa. As the emerging GIP regime shifts the importance of telecommunication 
policy from "low" policy to "high" policy, a number of global institutions and actors 
have aligned themselves within the new regime. The actors that have shaped governing 
structures include the (1) World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); (2) 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); (3) Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN); (4) Global Information 
Infrastructure Commission/Global Business Dialogue; (5) Group of 8 Industrialized 
Countries; (6) World Economic Forum (WEF); (7) World Bank Group; (8) European 
Commission; (9) International Telecommunication Union (ITU); and (10) Bi-Iateral aid 
agenCIes. 
The opposite approaches of the emerging GIP regime allow a study into the dominant 
direction of the regime and South Africa's response to the commitments of the dominant 
approach. Cogburn (2003) discusses potential outcomes the emerging GIP regime could 
accomplish. This study builds on those conclusions and provides a detailed look at South 
Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime. Having to accustom its domestic policy to 
the international agreements signed, South Africa is a useful example of a developing 
country negotiating the implementation of liberal reforms under the WTO. Balancing 
domestic socio-economic targets with international reforms is not unique to South Africa 
but given its powerful presence in Africa along with a private sector that wields a 
significant influence in policy formation, South Africa straddles the line between a 
developing and developed country. This situation highlights the dilemma developing 
countries face in having to delay the social development use of ICT in favour of the 
development of an international electronic commerce system prescribed by the WTO. 
The legacy that Apartheid has had on South Africa has challenged the present 
government to redress many of the structural imbalances that exist in many sectors of 
South African society. Telecommunication policy has been no different; "Measures to 











for example universal service and ownership by historically disadvantaged individuals, 
must inherently clash with the fundamental underpinnings of the GATS - market access 
and national treatment. Universal service aims, as we have seen in the SA context, may 
serve to buttress a monopoly and contribute to sustaining a closed market."!! The use of 
South Africa as a case-study will provide a useful reference because of its international 
political standing, geographical setting and growing economic presence among 
developing countries. These factors combined, place South Africa at the forefront of 
national telecommunication restructuring and provides an indicator of the severe socio-
political disparities that exist in many other developing countries between the "haves" 
and "have-nots". The data collected thus far (from studies such as Cogburn, 2003, 
Braman, 2004 and Makhaya and Roberts, 2003, Gillwald, 2005, Horwitz and Currie, 
2007) suggests that South Africa is engaging in a systematic attempt to leapfrog into the 
information age through a concerted strategy of infrastructure development, applications 
support, awareness raising, private investment, and public policy approaches. Despite 
championing global obligations for a liberalised telecommunication environment, South 
Africa faces considerable obstacles as it negotiates its pledge to uplift the poor with 
improved telecom access and roll-out the monopoly-run telecommunication infrastructure 
to under-serviced areas. These pressures stem directly from the emerging GIP regime and 
are a sign of international policy influencing domestic politics. 
As the nature of the global economy has changed in the last three decades, so has the 
previous telecommunications regime. "As the historical processes of globalization and an 
information age continue to unfold and the demands of global electronic commerce 
continue to expand, the international telecommunications regime is facing tremendous 
trans formative pressures. A wide range of social, political, economic, cultural, and 
technological factors are challenging this regime and pressing for the emergence of a new 
one, that might be called the global information infrastructure/global information society 
regime (GIIIGIS).,,12 By placing South Africa into this context, this study highlights the 
need for South Africa to change its telecommunications environment through sequenced 
11 Cohen (2001) pg. 752 











and consultative refonns. Stemming from its obligations to the electronic commerce 
approach, South Africa is compelled to liberalise its telecommunications sector while 
simultaneously providing the infrastructure for large sectors of its under-serviced society. 
1.2 - OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RESPONSE TO THE EMERGING GIP 
REGIME 
In addressing the problem statement described above, the analysis of South Africa 
reflects how it has adjusted to the nonns, principles and decision-making procedures of 
the emerging GIP regime. This study looks specifically at three interrelated areas that are 
worth an in-depth discussion regarding South Africa's accession to the WTO Agreement. 
They are competition, regulation and social returns from telecommunications. Makhaya 
and Roberts (2003) attach these interrelated areas to the experience of many developing 
countries included in the emerging GIP regime 13 . Given these three critical areas of 
refonn, this study concludes that the sector has not reformed sufficiently over the last 
decade to give the majority of its citizens the opportunity to participate in the information 
society. In addition to deep regulatory and anti-competitive problems, this study also 
contends that the vagueness of some regulatory principles within the WTO Basic 
Agreement on Telecommunications have not contributed to the development of the South 
African telecommunications sector. In an attempt to promote reform, partial privatisation 
provided the chance for opportunists to abuse the monopoly position of the incumbent 
with little fear of repercussion. The WTO Basic Agreement on Telecommunications has 
promoted liberalisation in countries where the necessary infrastructure and policies do 
not exist. Consequently, South Africa's compliance with the Agreement has been 
inconsistent due to its own domestic agenda and partial alignment with a developmental 
approach to the emerging GIP regime. Despite these sentiments, South Africa has had 
little other option than abide by the rules and norms of the emerging GIP regime. 
Regarding the direction of the emerging GIP regime, South Africa has attempted to 
bridge the gap between the electronic commerce and social welfare approaches with 
debatable success. Its commitments to the latter have been indicated in the policies it has 
13 Makhaya, G. and Roberts, S. (20003) "Telecommunications in Developing Countries: Reflections from 











adopted smce 1996. Highlighting the need for universal access and the roll-out of 
infrastructure to poor areas of the country, the policy objectives of the government have 
been to equip all sectors of society with the opportunity to the enter network society. In 
tenns of promoting electronic commerce, the government has recognised the need for a 
secure environment: "Government will provide support by setting policy and regulatory 
frameworks that are appropriate to the infonnation communications technology sector 
while taking cognisance of the pervasive nature of e-commerce and the challenges 
pertaining to legal and security matters.,,14 The last 15 years of telecommunications 
reform reveal that serious problems with the market structure and ministerial intervention 
have negatively affected the goals of universal service and the establishment of an 
independent regulator. In attempting to confonn to the international requisites of 
liberalization and privatization, South Africa has skewed its development program by 
emphasizing privatization at the expense of other refonn mechanisms (Gillwald, 2005). 
As a consequence, Horwitz and Currie (2007) note that "rent-seeking" and profit-
maximisation by the telecommunications incumbent has left the refonn process a relative 
failure. 
Running concurrently to South Africa's refonn process, was the international 
negotiations taking place within the emerging GIP regime. On an international level, 
South Africa has not fallen behind in the global shift of telecommunication policy 
relative to other developing countries. A major restructuring of the telecommunications 
sector took place soon after the first democratic elections in 1994. An important aspect of 
the restructuring process was the recognition by the South African government that all 
sectors of South African society would need to participate in the infonnation society. 
Early on in its democratic transition South Africa recognised that the changing 
telecommunications regime - from a monopolised state-controlled entity to the current 
era of liberalisation and the drive to provide universal access to the infonnation society15 
14 South African Department of Communications (2000) A Green Paper on Electronic Commerce for South 
Africa. Available at www.info.gov.za/greenpapers/2000/electronic commerce.pdf(Accessed December 16, 
2007) 
15 At the international level there has been a shift in responsibilities and power from older organizations 
such as the International Telecommunications Union towards newer organizations such as the World Trade 











- was having a dramatic effect on global governance and economIC growth16 and 
therefore needed to develop policies that would include them in the growth paths .Despite 
South Africa's intentions to provide leT access to the majority of the population, it has 
had to align its policies with the prerogatives of the dominant electronic commerce 
agenda. To effectively participate in the global economy South Africa had to align itself 
with the interest of the developed countries to attract investment. Thus, by being a 
signatory on the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, South Africa is also 
committed to the liberalisation of its telecommunications sector. 
1.2.1 - Research Question 
Since the focus of this study is to deconstruct the emerging GIP regime in relation to 
South Africa and analyse its response, the question at hand should ultimately probe this 
relationship. 
• What has South Africa's response been to the emerging global information policy 
regime? 
Incorporating both South Africa and the emerging GIP regime, this question takes into 
account the nature of domestic politics on global decision making and vice versa. The 
tenn "response" refers to changes in government policy in the telecommunications sector. 
Given the liberalising trend of South Africa's macro-economic policy since 1994, the 
telecommunications sector attempted to adapt its policies toward liberalisation. However, 
its policy changes have caused considerable disruption in the roll-out and accessibility of 
telecommunications and therefore an area of study that requires a thorough analysis. A 
plethora of loaded tenns such as globalisation, international regime theory, development 
and developing countries have been mentioned above with little reference to the 
relationship that exists between them. This research question has incorporated these tenns 
in the body of the study as South Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime is 
representing private, corporate and public interests, all trying to influence the international regulatory 
system. 
16 Wilson, EJ., 2006. The Information Revolution and Developing Countries. (MIT Press, Cambridge, 











analysed. The use of theoretically loaded terms such as ICT, developing countries, 
regimes, global infonnation society and digital divide requires clarification and an 
explanation of the relationship that exists between them. 
1.3 - CONCEPTUALISATION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
1.3.1 - Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
ICT has undoubtedly revolutionised mass communication over last three decades. 
However, it must not be assumed that ICT has caused such dramatic shifts in the global 
economy. As Castells notes "[T]echnology per se does not solve social problems. But the 
availability and use of information and communication technologies are a pre-requisite 
for economic and social development in our world. They are the functional equivalent of 
electricity in the industrial era."l7 In practical terms, "Information and communication 
technologies can be defined as 'electronic means of capturing, processing, storing, and 
communicating information'. ICTs are based on digital information held as 1 s and Os, 
and comprise computer hardware, software and networks."l8 
Examples of this distributive and storage technology are provided by Rosenau and Singh 
(2002) who include print and broadcast media and telecommunications (telephone, fax, 
cellphones and the Internet), channels of communication (satellite, fibre optic cables) and 
storage devices (CD/DVD ROMS)l9. "ICT is defined not as machinery but as a scarce 
and valuable resource that people compete for and that benefits those who can manoeuvre 
themselves to avoid its downside risks. In this respect, information technology is not just 
a benign application like mobile phones, distance education, or Internet telephony. 
Instead ICT is like land and capital, which has differential impacts when diffused 
differentially across nations and social groupS.,,20 
17 Castells, Manuel. (1999) "Information Technologies, Globalization and Social Development" in 
UNRISD Discussion Paper no. 114 (Geneva) pp. 3 
18 Heeks, Richard. (June 1999) "Information and Communication Technologies, Poverty and 
Development" in Development Informatics: Working Paper, no. 5 (Institute for Development Policy and 
Management: Manchester) pg. 3 
19 Rosenau and Singh, (2002) Information Technologies and Global Politics: the Changing Scope of Power 
and Governance (State University of New York Press: New York) pg. 2 











Having an idea of what technologies make up ICT is important, however understanding 
the importance ofICT diffusion is more of a requirement. "A strong, flexible and modem 
national communication system has become a requirement for capital investment, both 
foreign and local. Transnational corporations regularly report that a modem national 
information infrastructure is a least as important as low taxes and low wages for where 
they will invest.,,21 On a political and economic level, the above conceptualisation 
underlines the importance of telecommunication policy in South Africa. Combining the 
above conceptualisations of ICT, this study regards its use as a tool to integrate 
developing countries into the information economy as its main contribution. From the 
highest corporate level to rural fanners, affordable and accessible ICT provides the 
opportunity for faster and more efficient production capabilities as well as social 
upliftment. However, to utilise ICT for social change, political power and knowledge is 
needed among the epistemic communities that make up the international regulatory 
authorities. 
1.3.2 - Epistemic Communities 
Epistemic Communities occupy an important role in the decisions made by policy 
makers. They can be defined as "network[ s] of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain,,22. These communities stimulate the circulation of ideas 
from societies to government and among different countries. 
These knowledge-based transnational communities with shared understandings have 
legitimacy because of their role in the bureaucratic apparatus of a country as well as the 
political power they wield in determining policy formulation. Adler and Haas (cited in 
Hasenclever et aI, 1996) argue that epistemic communities can influence the creation and 
maintenance of international regimes at four stages of the policy process. They are: 
policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection and regime persistence23 . 
21 Ibid. pg. 6 
22 Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, V., (1996) "Interests, Power Knowledge: The Study of 
International Regimes" in Mershon International Studies Review (40) pg. 209 











Conceptualising epistemic communities for this study is of central importance as it 
highlights how the electronic commerce approach usurped the social-welfare ambitions 
of the emerging GIP regime. Technical specialists and commerce-minded groups from 
developed countries have managed to shift the role of the emerging GIP regime to the 
interests of electronic commerce. This was done through policy creation in the structures 
of the international institutions (like the WTO) that dominate the emerging GIP regime. 
Consequently, the interests of poorer countries have not been taken into serious 
consideration as the norms, rules and decision making structures of the regIme were 
created in the absence of developing countries, by an epistemic community made up of 
elites and their preferred interests in the development of e-commerce regime enforced by 
the WTO and ICANN. The resulting impact on South Africa contributes to a situation 
that many other developing countries also have to battle with. Understanding these battles 
can be achieved by conceptualising what a "developing country" is. 
1.3.3 - Defining a Developing Country 
The term developing country has been used frequently thus far with little clarification. 
Using Educardo Talero's (discussed and defined in Wilson, 2004) definition provides a 
useful context. Noted as "the group of countries in which the fight against poverty, 
malnutrition, infant mortality, illiteracy, gross social and income inequality, poor 
administration of justice, inefficient government, and environmental degradation is most 
pressing. The term does not imply homogeneity in any other respect or that other 
economies have reached a preferred stage of development.,,24 Since South Africa falls 
into these categories and is a prominent campaigner for developing world solidarity, the 
term requires a conceptualisation that incorporates both over-arching characteristics and 
ICT. Wilson (2004) provides a few key points25 : 
• Developing country populations are severely bifurcated between poor and rich, 
and the poor find it nearly impossible to bridge the gap; 












• Developing countries are likely to possess weak and inexperienced institutions 
and systems of economic governance that subvert the indigenous efforts to 
manage technological innovation and change (and to "leapfrog" the ICT gap); and 
• Poor countries are less knowledgeable about, and less engaged in, the forums 
where the rules of the global information society are being written and enforced. 
The incorporation of the debates about developing country inclusion in the network 
society in this study fonns an important part of the international relations debate. Using 
the tenns netvvork society, information society, global information society and global 
information infrastructure interchangeably, the origins of this information-led drive for 
developing countries is important. The position of South Africa has been central to this 
drive as indicated in the 1995 G7 Ministerial Conference on the Infonnation Society in 
Brussels: "At the G7 conference Mr. Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's then Executive 
Deputy President, challenged the organisation and the European Commission to organise 
a follow-up conference bringing together representatives of the developed and developing 
world.,,26 The Brussels meeting indicated an important recognition of ICT access and the 
rise of the Global Information Infrastructure. Subsequently, the 1996 Information Society 
and Development (IS AD) conference took place in Midrand, South Africa to further 
discuss the potential of the Gil for economic and social change. "This conference 
emphasized the need to adopt national plans to foster the development of the NIl 
[National Information Infrastructure]. It called for coordinated action by G7 countries and 
the developing countries to promote the use of ICTS.',27 Instigating the need for 
continuous consultation, South Africa has seen ICT as a valuable stepping stone for 
developing countries to enter the network society. Within a neoliberal framework, 
developing countries have often suffered socio-economic hardship due to a number of 
international and domestic factors. Using aspects of dependency literature, this study 
conceptualises developing countries as being on the "periphery" of the capitalist order 
26 Audenhove, L., Burgelman, J., Nulens G., and Cammaerts, B., (1999) "Information society policy in the 












and therefore marginalised in receiving the fruits of the international economl8 as well 
as being excluded in the epistemic communities that control the emerging GIP regime. 
Chapter three will highlight that slgnmg the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications was an indication of successful developing world involvement in 
assuring potentially preferable tenns in the agreement. Despite their prominent 
involvement, the consequences have not been as successful as anticipated. 
1.3.4 - Regimes 
The integral inclusion of the emerging global infonnation policy regime in the GIl is just 
part of the wider discourse on the impact of ICTs in international relations. More 
specifically, a brief introduction into understanding the regime is important. A consensual 
definition by regime scholars is provided by Krasner (1982) who defines regimes as: 
"sets of implicit or explicit principles, nonns, rules and decision making procedures 
around which actors' expectations converge in given areas of international relations.,,29 
Incorporating a range of concepts, from the very abstract to the very specific, a regime 
operates on a number of levels, "however; functionally specific regimes are often 
directed by technical specialists and mid-level administrators m participating 
governments while functionally diffuse regimes are more likely to be managed by 
diplomatic generalists and higher-level political officers.,,3o ICT can therefore be 
classified as a functionally specific regime. 
The regime dealt with in this study is still in its fonnative stages but has been subject to 
research that has indicated the functioning nature of its regulatory framework. "The 
policy network literature emphasises that policy-making takes place within a variety of 
networks that are more likely to be interpersonal than structural and which exist at the 
sectorallevels.,,31 Braman (2004) goes on to conceptualise regimes into three fonns. 
28 See Hoff, K. and J. E. Stiglitz. (2001). "Modern Economic Theory and Development." In Gerald M. 
Meier and Joseph E. Stiglitz, eds., Frontiers of Development Economics: The Future in Perspective. 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press) for a detailed look at the conditions developing countries have 
endured. 
29 Krasner, S. (1982). International Regimes. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pg. 2 












l. At macro-level, the regime has been applied as abstract conceptions of capital 
accumulation within celiain material constraints: "The notion of a regime has 
been applied to fundamental elements of international relations such as free trade 
and reliance upon the market. .. The term has also been used abstractly to describe 
a decision-making procedure around which actors' expectations converge." 
2. At a micro-level "are concrete approaches that define regimes narrowly as social 
institutions governing actions of those interested in very specific types of 
activities." Information as an issue area occupies a distinct example of changes in 
perceptions and behaviours by a series of coordinated bureaucracies that were 
dependent on the perceptions of the actors. 
3. The dominating level of analysis in regimes is a meso-level understanding. It is 
described as "specific ways of shaping relationships among actors that embody 
abstract principles but are operationalised in a multitude of diverse concrete 
institutions, agreements, and procedures ... Regimes thus understood are a 
cooperative, sociological, mode of conflict management." This study borrows 
directly from Krasner's (1982) definition stated above that is distinctly situated on 
a meso-level. 
As regimes can function with or without a central institution, this study's use of a meso-
level analysis will highlight the role of the diverse stakeholders involved in the emerging 
GIP regime. Despite the involvement of many state and non-state stakeholders, the realist 
approach this study adopts will concentrate on the power that hegemonic states use to 
maintain the regime by compelling members to participate. 
1.3.5 - Globalisation 
An important aspect of understanding ICT in international relations is to review the all 
encompassing process of globalisation. The multi-dimensional nature of globalisation 
requires a definition that is precise and highlights the importance of ICT. The use of 
globalisation in this study is situated within a political economy perspective. Castells 
(1999) recognises the importance of the economic dimension: "A global economy is an 
economy whose core activities work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale. Thus 











countries, even if most of them are not globally invested, depend for their perfonnance on 
the evolution and behaviour of global financial markets.,,32 Despite greater interaction 
between state and non-state actors in the global economy, many countries are 
marginalised. Those countries that do not fall into the well developed research centres 
that are situated in North America, Western Europe and parts of Asia are often excluded 
from the benefits provided in the global economy. As weaker nation states encounter the 
dilemmas involved from being excluded from the benefits of the global economy, the 
need for cooperation between the connected and under-serviced in the area of ICT takes 
priority. "Globalization and liberalization do not eliminate the nation state, but they 
fundamentally redefine its role and affect its operation ... National governments, in order 
to maintain some capacity to manage global flows of capital and information, band 
together, creating or adapting supranational institutions, to which they surrender much of 
their sovereignty. So they survive, but under a new form of state that links supranational 
institutions, national states, regional and local governments, and even NGOs, in a 
network of interaction and shared decision making that becomes the prevalent political 
form of the information age: the network state.,,33 
By understanding the political economy context, a definition of globalisation that closely 
follows the theme of this study is provided by McGrew (cited in Cogburn, 2000) who 
asserts that globalization "is the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections that 
transcend the nation-states (and by implication societies) which make up the modem 
world system. It defines a process through which events, decisions, and activities in one 
part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and 
communities in quite distant parts of the globe.,,34 
Despite the literature on globalisation being continually updated, this conceptualisation 
has stressed the marginalised role of developing countries and mentioned the need for 
supranational organisations or regimes to articulate diverse needs in an environment with 
32 Castells (1999) pg. 4 
33 Ibid pp. 5 
34 McGrew (1992) cited in Cogburn, D., (2000) "Globalization and Governance in Cyberspace: 
Mapping the Processes of Emergent Regime Formation in Global Information and Communications 











shared nonns and practices. The importance is stressed by Cogburn (2000) who notes that 
"One of the reasons that the lnfonnation Economy offers such promise to Africa is that 
each of these 'spheres' [social, political, economic and cultural] of globalisation is 
supported by the application of electronic commerce. Also, through strategic planning, 
the opportunity exists for key geographic areas in Africa to exploit infonnation and 
communication technologies to become 'spaces' of globalisation.,,35 This study therefore 
incorporates the above definitions and regards the process of globalisation as a social, 
political and economic phenomenon that creates the environment for lCT to be used to its 
maximum capacity and uplift marginalised areas to a level where competition in the trade 
of services is balanced. The dominance of electronic commerce in the emerging GlP 
regime necessitates that developing countries utilise the current globalisation 
environment to close the gap in the "digital divide" through liberalising its 
telecommunications sector and introducing competition where accessibility costs are 
high. 
1.3.6 - Digital Divide 
Linked to the processes of globalisation mentioned above is a tenn that has gained 
prominence in recent years. The digital divide represents a socio-economic condition and 
has been discussed in a substantial mass of literature on lCT in international relations. 
Although this study departs itself from developmental literature, understanding the digital 
divide is vital to placing the emerging GlP regime and South Africa in the appropriate 
context. 
The tenn was thrust into the international limelight in the 1990s partly due to a renewed 
debate on the issue in the United States and Western Europe. The rise of the network 
society stimulated media and scholarly interest in the rapidly evolving infonnation 
society. A single definition was difficult to come by since many meanings were attached 
to the tenn. Van Dijk (2005) notes that previously the "ancient problem of information 
inequality was framed in more abstract tenns, such as knowledge gap, computer literacy, 
and participation in the infonnation society ... Commonly, the digital divide was defined 











as the gap between those who do and those who do not have access to computers and the 
internet. Access first of all meant physical access: having a personal computer and 
Internet connection.,,36 However, "access" to leT has developed over time and its 
importance magnified in developing countries. Many developing countries aspire to 
"universal access", defined by Wilson (2004) as "ensuring some kind of leT services 
within a 'reasonable' distance of most citizens, whether in the home or in public 
institutions like schools, community centers, and government agencies. ,,37 Providing 
universal access has its foundations in the appropriate policy-making circles at global 
conferences and meetings. Like South Africa, the provision of universal access is keenly 
anticipated in many developing countries but is still a distant reality as access is income 
driven and therefore crippled by high leT accessibility costs. 
Wilson's (2004) comments expand into a definition of the digital divide that "refers to an 
inequality in access, distribution, and use of information and communication technologies 
between two or more populations ... digital divides are large structural impediments to 
equal access.,,38 Despite attempts at conceptualisation, four pitfalls of the metaphor are 
noted by Van Dijk (2005). They include problems such as: 
• reductionist understandings; 
• wrong connotations; 
• that the divide is absolute and unbridgeable; and 
• that there is only one divide when many are running parallel to each other. 39 
Although the digital divide has been criticised for its ambiguity (Gunkel, 2003), the 
research undertaken on the topic thus far has produced achievements III 
conceptualisation. Van Dijk (2006) notes that progress was evident in the understanding 
of the types of access, from material access, motivational access, skills access to usage 
access. "A shift of attention from physical access to skills usage is observed. In terms of 
physical access the divide seems to be closing in the most developed countries; 
36 Van Dijk, Jan., (2005) The Deepening Divide: Inequality in the Information Society, (London, New 
Delhi: SAGE Publications) pg. 1 
37 Wilson (2004) pg. 300 
38 Ibid. 











concerning digital skills and the use of applications the divide persists or widens.,,4o In 
terms of South Africa, Fuchs and Horak (2006) provide a useful analysis of the 
detrimental effects of the digital divide in many African countries. Understanding the 
context that South Africa engages in global telecommunications is closely linked to the 
above conceptualisation of the digital divide. Regarding South Africa's role in both 
power relations in the emerging GIP regime's epistemic community and among other 
developing countries is crucial in understanding policy decisions it has to take. This study 
incorporates aspects of the digital divide as it analyses the emerging GIP regime. 
1.3.7- Governance in Telecommunications 
This literature reVIew includes the impact leT has had on international relations, 
allowing the regIme analysis to be put in context. As mentioned earlier, 
telecommunication policy is located in governance issues within international relations. 
As opposed to matters related to instrumental and structural power, whereby leT is 
enabling fonnerly underprivileged groups to play a role in global politics and 
reconstituting issue-areas, the changing scope of governance is arguably shifting the 
locus of authority away from the state because of the network society.41 The information 
society, in which the emerging GIP regime overarches the global regulatory framework, 
has undoubtedly had an influence on the foundations of international relations over the 
past two decades. "The rise of information networks thus impacts patterns of governance 
in three distinct ways: (1) states are no longer the only actors in technological matters 
globally, (2) we now speak of technological plurality rather than of a technological order, 
and, (3) global advocacy networks, especially among underprivileged groups, are 
undermining the legitimacy of existing centres of authority.,,42 Stimulating a valuable 
debate on the role of leT in international relations requires questioning the realist 
framework this study adopts. Through analysing the role of collective action within the 
emerging GIP regime and the influence non-state stakeholders have in international 
40 Van Dijk, Jan (2006) "Digital divide research, achievements and shortcomings" in Poetics (34) pg. 221 -
222 
41 Rosenau and Singh (2002) pg.6, 18 











power structures; this study will attempt to demonstrate the importance of global 
governance in current neoliberal environment. 
As some authors have been reluctant to over-emphasise the impact ofICT in international 
relations (Keohane and Nye, 1998)43, the recognition of policy frameworks that reassess 
the role of the state has been noticeable. "The most powerful engine of change in the 
relative decline of states and the rise of non-state actors is the computer and 
telecOlmnunications revolution, whose deep political and social consequences have been 
almost completely ignored ... Above all, the infonnation technologies disrupt hierarchies, 
spreading power among more people and groups. In drastically lowering the costs of 
communication, consultation, and coordination, they favour decentralized networks over 
modes of organization.,,44 Issues of global governance and the multiplicity of actors that 
have converged on global politics will be discussed later in the study. By now it should 
be clear that the emerging GIP regime is a governance structure over-arching state and 
non-state actors. An important aspect of this study is to look at the power relations that 
exist in those governance structures between the different stakeholders and between 
states. 
1.4 - METHODOLOGY OF STUDY 
The methodology that will be utilised in this study is qualitative in nature. A significant 
amount of this discussion will come from debates articulated by authors with specific 
points aggregated into a clear discussion within this study. The use of South Africa as a 
case-study will be the basis for a debate on the emerging GIP regime's effect on a 
developing country. The material on South Africa is accessed from research databases 
and scholarly articles by experts in the field. Defining the relevant tenns, providing the 
theoretical framework and developing an analysis of the case-study will all be sourced 
from existing literature on the topic of ICT and regime theory. 
43 "Prophets of a new cyberworld, like modernists before them, often overlook how much the new world 
overlaps and rests on the traditional world in which power depends on geographically based institutions" 
Keohane, R. and Nye J ( September/ October 1998) "Power and Independence in the Information Age" in 
Foreign Affairs 77(5) pg. 82 











Secondary sources will come from books, journals and electronic sources such as 
newspapers and the internet. The provision of international agreements are important as 
this study will concentrate on international organisations and private sector organisations 
that are promoting the new era of liberalised telecommunication policies. This data will 
be sourced from the relevant institutional websites such as the World Trade Organisation, 
International Telecommunications Union, Development Gateway, UNDP, World Bank 
(PovertyNet), NEPAD, Global Development Network, Centre for Global Development, 
Stats SA and the Government of South Africa. 
The arguments made in this study are based on the opinions of the different authors. The 
analysis of South Africa's response took the findings of the different authors into 
perspective and highlighted their concerns and recommendations for the South African 
telecommunication sector. Relying primarily on a descriptive analysis of the 
telecommunications sector, this study'S analysis uses the literature as a basis for its 
argument that South Africa was ill-equipped to deal with privatisation of the sector. The 
recommendations made, are a reflection of the opinions of specialists in the field as well 
as the author's observations of how the sector can benefit from certain changes. These 
proposals evaluate an analysis based on a number of sources and opinions in a clear and 
distinct manner while keeping with the general trend of recommendations for the sector. 
As discussed above, the emergmg GIP regIme IS fast becoming a vast network of 
international stakeholders with different ambitions for the information society. Cogburn's 
(2004) attempt to differentiate between the electronic commerce and social welfare 
approaches of the emerging GIP regime provides a useful avenue for an important debate. 
Although the focus of this study is to understand South Africa's response to changing 
regimes, it will not be confined to those specific theoretical borders. This study aims to 
outline and briefly discuss the broader implications of accession to liberalisation 
agreements for developing countries. Having to negotiate domestic refonns with 
international agreements for developing countries will be discussed in greater detail while 











Having outlined the basic assumptions above, the focus of the following emerging GIP 
regime analysis can be narrowed down within clear theoretical borders. 
1.5 - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, REGIME 
THEORY ANDICT 
The theoretical framework that this study utilises is made up of three themes. All are 
interrelated and with important links to international relations. Firstly, this study is 
located in a post-Cold War neoliberal timeframe. This means that the current era of 
economic globalisation whereby "all economic decisions and actions would transcend 
state boundaries and would only be determined by the price mechanism of the market"45, 
is critical to understanding political economy dynamics of inter-state relations. Secondly, 
this study uses a regime theory's realist tradition to explain the attempts at collective 
action among states, and more specifically utilises hegemonic-stability theory to explain 
regime change and formation from a realist perspective. As a combination of the first two 
themes, the third theme is related to the power dynamics that exist between developed 
and developing countries and singles out the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications to link all three together. An illustrated guide to the way these three 
themes interact is provided in Figure 2. It displays the international context that South 
Africa's response is placed in. 
45 Schrire, R.,(2000) "The Duality of Globalization: A View from the South," Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, Vo1.14, No.1, pp. 51-52. However, this study assets that state centrality is still of 
great importance as Gilpin, R., (2001) Global Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
pg. 3 notes that: "the extent and significance of economic globalisation is not nearly as extensive nor as 
sweeping in its consequences (negative or positive) as many contemporary observers believe. This is still a 











Figure 2: The interrelationship between the neoliberal paradigm and {actors that 
influence South Africa's commitments 











The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is integral to the overall process of 
liberalisation that this study focuses on. Figure 2 makes this connection visible as it 
charts the Agreement as being part of the emerging GIP regime that is dominated by the 
neoliberal paradigm. To clearly understand the implications of liberalisation for states in 
telecommunications, we need to briefly look at the benefits of competition. Baer (cited in 
Dutton, 1996) highlights four areas of potential value46 : 
1. Price reductions, quality and variety of service offerings; 
2. Expanded usage by a wider variety of citizens; 
3. Investment in the telecommunications sector; and 
4. Increased growth and output in other sectors. 
46 Dutton, W. H., (ed) (1996) Information and Communication Technologies: Visions and Realities, 











This study does not take the supposed benefits of competition as a truism. A number of 
factors need to be in place for the benefits to develop, especially in developing countries. 
Therefore, a rather critical stance is taken on the full adoption of liberalisation principles 
advocated by the WTO in the emerging GIP regime. It is important to mention this stance 
as power dynamics in the international political economy are directly linked to adoption 
and implementation of neoliberal refonns. 
Any study conducted in the field of international relations cannot ignore the core 
concepts of the political science discipline. The study of power and governance is 
implicit to understanding the rise of the infonnation network era. "Networking, entailing 
communication and infonnation exchange, is changing both the way power is exercised 
and governance is organised in global politics.,,47 The rise of this network society has 
provided the means for developing countries to leapfrog development stages into an arena 
where they can compete with industrialised nations in service-oriented areas. Despite the 
potential that exists, the nation state should not be disregarded in a multiple stakeholder 
arrangement such as the emerging GIP regime. As many authors have noted, the direction 
of the emerging GIP regime has gravitated toward developed country interests given the 
central organisation of the regime. This study has not made the assumption that all 
countries will fare well in a liberalised environment. It will track the role of influential 
countries such as the United States of America to highlight its hegemony in global power 
relationships. 
For the theory-based analysis, Krasner's48 approach to international regImes will be 
adopted. Briefly defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, nonns, rules and 
decision making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in given areas of 
international relations", regime theory is a useful tool to understand the liberalisation of 
telecommunications. Regime theory has proved useful in understanding infonnation 
policy on a global level. "It [regime theory] explained cooperative behaviours [and] was 
47 Rosenau, 1. and Singh 1. eds. (2002) pg. 2 











the first approach that made it possible to address both conflict and cooperation in global 
power structures within the same theoretical framework.,,49 
According to Cowhey (1990), regIme theory suits the telecommunications transition 
because of the theoretical explanations it offers. The three approaches to regime theory, 
known as functional, international power based and cognitive frameworks note that even 
under anarchy, states have an incentive to look for cooperative solutions to collective 
action problems5o . Given the rapid change in telecommunication technology and costs, 
change in the telecommunications regime was possible since a number of actors shifted 
domestic and international telecommunication policy away from monopoly-run entities. 
As regime theory gained theoretical prominence in the late twentieth century, various 
arenas such as international shipping and atomic energy could also be classified into 
regimes. Since the emerging GIP regime is not fully mature, many of its features are still 
contested. Nevertheless, Braman (2004) notes that explicit features of the emerging 
global infonnation policy regime include transparency, having organisational networks as 
organising principles, shared private and public sector responsibility for policy-making 
and realising infonnational power as the dominant fonn of power. As the emerging GIP 
regime is still in its fonnative stages, regime fonnation51 is of central importance to this 
study. Despite regime theory's useful application, it has encountered criticisms by many 
authors (Strange, 1982, Frankel, 1991) as being a passing fad or being imprecise. These 
critiques are considered in later chapters. 
Related to the emphasis on cooperation m regIme theory is the use of a theoretical 
perspective of globalisation which will contribute a significant amount to this study. The 
expansion of the globalisation discourse into social, political, cultural and economic 
spheres has meant that a focussed definition and approach is needed. Taking into account 
49 Braman (2004) pg. 21 
50 Cowhey (1990) 
51 Braman (2004: 20) describes regime formation as the process by which new policy forms emerge out of 
the policy field. It occurs when factors internal and external to the issue area require transformations in law 
and regulation; in the case of information policy, technological innovation and the consequent processes of 
globalisation have been particularly important factors in stimulating the transformation of the global 










that globalisation has numerous definitions, this study will utilise it as a phenomena 
defined in its economic and political understanding by Castells (1996), Gilpin (2001), 
Stiglitz (2002) and other political economy scholars mentioned above. 
1.6 - OBJECTIVES OF STUDY 
• To provide a detailed analysis of South Africa's telecommunications restructuring 
process in relation to the global liberalising trend over the last three decades by 
outlining the reasons and costs of delayed liberalisation in South Africa's 
telecommunications sector; 
• To detail the power dynamics between developed countries, developing countries 
and non-government organisations in the emerging GIP regime; 
• To assess whether the emerging GIP regime is an effective mode of international 
cooperation by utilising the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications as a 
coordinating tool; and 
• Provide recOlmnendations for a programme of refonn that would make South 
Africa competitive in the information economy and make ICTs accessible to a 
wider variety of its citizens. 
1.7- LIMITATIONS AND MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
The limitations relate to the time-span and scope of this study. Since this study 
concentrates on a specific aspect of ICT in international relations, the scope was 
narrowed down to international policy fonnulation and adoption within a certain regime. 
The emerging global information policy regime incorporates a variety of sectors that are 
worthy of intense investigation by themselves. However, by providing a descriptive 
analysis, this study examines specific power relations in the regime and the consequent 
effects on domestic policy. The time-span is fairly short and does not allow for an in-
depth analysis of the case-study or a comparative analysis with other developing 
countries. The findings of this study relate specifically to South Africa, therefore they 












The motivation for this study stems from the dynamic nature with which international 
relations is being affected by globalisation and telecommunications. As the world enters 
the infonnation age, global politics has had to adjust to a rapidly changing environment. 
The need to provide a regulatory framework is of critical importance since the structured 
fonuulation and implementation of telecommunication policy can attract much needed 
foreign investment for developing countries. However, the potential exists for the 
emerging GIP regime to incorporate developing countries from the periphery of the 
political, economic and social wilderness into the core decision making structures of the 
global economy. Accessible infonnation has the ability to change the dynamics of power 
relations in a global and domestic context and therefore is an area of study that should be 
keenly viewed as an important discourse in international relations. 
1.8 - CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter One has outlined the research direction and theoretical borders of this study. The 
complex interrelationship between the emerging GIP regime and the neoliberal political 
economy is tied to a debate that looks at the response from South Africa to this 
international environment. As a developing country, South Africa's domestic and 
international conditions are conducive to understanding how the emerging GIP regime 
operates and the faults that lie in its dominant electronic commerce approach. Through 
the conceptualisation of tenus and research framework, this chapter has set the orderly 
flow of the argument and provided appropriate context in which to understand the contest 
between complying with international trade agreements and taking care of domestic 
socio-economic concerns. 
Chapter Two provides a historical analysis of the international telecommunication 
regime. By providing a descriptive account of the old regime and the transition to the 
emerging GIP regime, this study provides the necessary background and theoretical 
foundations for the case-study. To maintain the specific focus of describing the emerging 
GIP regime and noting South Africa's response, a detailed explanation of international 











made to keep the link between the emergmg GIP regIme, regIme theory and the 
international relations disciplines visible. In understanding the power dynamics of 
regimes, a neo-realist approach will be used to explain regime fonnation and the 
influences behind the rules, nonns, procedures and decision-making structures of the 
emerging GIP regime. By describing the theoretical basis for the emerging regime, the 
chapter concludes by introducing the specific agreements upon which the policy 
framework for the emerging regime depends. 
Chapter three investigates the origins and implications of the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. With a specific focus on developing countries, the chapter 
highlights the neoliberal context the regime operates in and whether signatories of the 
Agreement have benefited. A brief discussion on the consequences of accession explores 
the power relationship between developed and developing countries and the 
commitments of the Reference Paper that have caused serious implementation problems 
for developing countries. This chapter effectively looks at the nature of an international 
organisation within the emerging GIP regime and concludes by discussing the domestic 
implications of the Agreement for South Africa as a developing country. 
Chapter four is an analysis of the case-study. Having described the economIC and 
political conditions of emerging GIP regime and the central agreement that makes it 
function in the first three chapters, chapter four explores South Africa's response to the 
emerging GIP regime. Keeping in mind South Africa's prominent role in the developing 
world as well as being a founding member of the WTO, this case-study is the ideal 
platfonn to discuss the implications of an international policy regime on a sovereign 
state. Specifically, the two areas of contention - market structure and independent 
regulation - highlight the problematic nature of liberalisation in a developing country. By 
guiding the study through regime theory and the emerging GIP regime, the case study 
debates the benefits regimes add to collective action among states. 
Chapter Five concludes this study with a set of summaries and recommendations for 











from the vanous debates mentioned in chapters two, three and foUf, along with an 
emphasis on the specific objectives South Africa should take as it finds its place in the 
network society. The recommendations made are a reflection of the general trend of 
proposals that different authors have discussed in the literature on the South Africa 
telecOlmnunications sector. Having taken a number of issues surrounding privatisation 
and the global trend toward liberalisation into account, the recommendations aim to 












REGimE THEOR!::::I AnD THE EUOLUTlon OF 
THE TELEcommuniCATions REGimE 
The international relations discipline within political science is often tom between two 
dominant theories. Table I highlights the key differences between these two approaches 
to regime analysis, namely liberal institutionalism and realism. Although they 
differentiate in areas such as power relations they both make the common assumption 
that regimes promote international order and that states are rational and unitary actors. 
One specific aspect of the debate centres on collective action between states. Although 
realism makes a strong case for the unlikelihood of strong mutually-representative 
collaboration, the emergence of the global information policy regime has provided a 
useful example for a counter argument. Regimes present evidence of states cooperating 
for mutual agreement on certain issues, while varying in degrees of institutionalism. 
"What many now call neo-liberal institutionalism arose, in part, to explain how 
cooperation could survive and even thrive at the international level - especially in fields 
of trade and monetary relations - in the face of the declining capacity of the United States 
to act as an effective hegemon."s2 
Table 1. - Liberal institutional versus realist approaches to the analysis o/regimes 
Liberal Institutionalists Realists 
l. Regimes enable states to l. Regimes enable states to co-
collaborate ordinate 
2. Regimes promote the common 2. Regimes generate differential 
good benefits for states 
3. Regimes flourish best when 3. Power is the central feature of 
promoted and maintained by a regime formation and survival 
benign hegemon 
4. Regimes promote globalization and 4. The nature of world order depends 
a liberal world order on the underlying principles and norms 
of regimes 
Source: Bayhs and SmIth (200 I), pg. 30 I 
52 Ba, A. and Hoffman, M. (eds) (2005) Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, 











As this chapter will indicate, cooperation among states IS subject to the influences 
powerful states have over economic and political multilateral forums. Despite the 
constructive cooperation between states, there are dominant countries and organisations 
that lead the regime in a certain direction. To clearly understand how regimes make up an 
important part of international relations, this chapter has been separated into three 
sections. The first section will explore why regime theory was the most appropriate 
theoretical framework for this study. A brief investigation its origins, features and 
criticisms will set the foundation for understanding the next sections. Section two will 
provide a historical analysis of the international telecommunications regime that traces 
the rise of economic liberalisation in telecommunications while section three will explain 
the shift toward and characteristics of the emerging global information policy regime. 
2.1- THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL COOPERATION? 
Over the last few decades, regime theory has emerged as a valid tool in synthesising 
analytically distinct theories such as realism and liberalism under the "institutionalism" 
umbrella. Although a fairly recent contribution to international relations discipline, 
regime theory has fulfilled its potential in providing an avenue of exploration for 
explaining cooperation among states. The following analysis will group writings about 
regime theory and explain how the emerging global information policy regime is a 
working demonstration of the theory. 
Fitting into the broader field of "governance without a government", regime analysis has 
made a strong case for solutions to collective action problems53 . As mentioned in chapter 
one, Krasner's (1983) widely accepted definition54 has been regarded as the consensual 
explanation by international relations scholars for a fairly complex theory. However, 
Keohane (cited in Rittberger, 1993) noted that there are problems of interpretation with 
the above definition. "The most fundamental issue is whether regimes are to be identified 
53 Krasner, S. D., (April, 1991) "Global Communication and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier" 
in World Politics 43. notes that dilemmas of common aversions refer to situations in which actors must 
coordinate their policies by agreeing on some set of rules or conventions, to avoid mutually undesirable 
outcomes. (pp 338) 
54 Krasner (1983) "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures 











on the basis of explicit rules and procedures, or on the basis of observed behaviour, from 
which rules, norms, principles, and procedures can be inferred. Defining regimes simply 
in tenns of explicit rules and procedures risks slipping into the fonnalism characteristic 
of some traditions of international law (author's italics)"ss Keohane steers away from 
sociological interpretations and settles on international regimes as being "institutions with 
explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in 
international relations. Conventions are informal institutions, with implicit rules and 
understandings, that shape the expectations of actors."S6 This differentiation between 
conventions and regimes points toward the broader importance of explicit rules and 
procedures in international relations. Despite contestation in certain definitions, the 
conceptualisation of terms such as norms, principles, rules and procedures are necessary 
for any further discussion on regimes. As Krasner notes: "Principles are seen as beliefs of 
fact, causation or rectitude; norms are seen as standards of behavior defined in terms of 
rights and obligations; rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action; and 
decision-making procedures are the prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice."s7 
This study regards regime theory as a useful tool in understanding the current era of 
global governance. It picks up where traditional theories of international law and 
organisational theory left gaps which attribute governance to formal structures. The 
inadequacies of these formal structures in conceptualizing a forum where states cooperate 
with relatively equal representation, such as various United Nations (UN) agencies, have 
been demonstrated over time. Therefore the need for proposals that break away from UN 
reform mechanisms is clearly filled by the issue-specific and inclusive nature of regime 
theory. 
SS Keohane cited in Rittberger, Volker (ed). (1993) Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford: 
Clare don Press) pg. 27 
S6 Ibid. 28 - 29 











2.1.1 - A neo-realist framework 
Given the theoretical dominance of realism in international relations, what chance does a 
theory that hinges on global cooperation stand? This line of thought questions whether 
regimes do indeed matter in an anarchic international system. Rittberger (1993) notes that 
"regime theorists have proposed a number of reasons why regimes should matter. Within 
a modified, neo-realist framework, international regimes can affect both the capabilities 
and the interests of states. International regimes can affect capabilities by serving as a 
source of influence for states whose policies are consistent with regime rules, or which 
are advantaged by regime's decision-making procedures."s8 Given the length constraints 
of this study, condensing the analysis of regime theory implies concentrating on a 
specific strand of the theory. In accordance with neo-realist and neo-Marxist 
interpretations that emphasise the role of power relations in international regimes, this 
study adopts the view that the power dynamics have taken the form of hegemonic states 
exercising their strength to influence the regime. Classified theoretically by regime 
scholars as hegemonic-stability theory, it is asserted that "regimes are established and 
maintained by actors who hold a preponderance of power resources relevant to a 
particular issue-area"s9 Originating out of Mancur Olsen's (1965) work on collective 
action, hegemonic-stability theory rests on the assumption that "in the absence of 
coercion or additional inducements beyond the potential benefits of the public good itself, 
large groups will fail to produce collective goods ... Some small groups are 'privileged' by 
the fact that at least one group member will have sufficiently strong interest in the good 
to provide at least some amount of it even if no one else shares the costS.,,60 It is 
especially important to recognise this realist strand of thought in the context of a 
developing country's ability to participate in the emerging GIP regime. According to 
Hasenclever et al (1993), regimes are supplied by hegemons and are dependent on their 
involvement in the issue area: "Thus, the ultimate explanation for the fonnation and 
persistence of regimes lies in there being a highly unequal distribution of power in a 
58 Ibid. 
59 Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., and Rittberger, v., (1996) pg. 197 











given issue-area.,,61 Further chapters will elaborate on the role of powerful nations vis-a-
vis international organisations influencing the regime. 
With regIme theory effectively trying to explain the "possibility, conditions , and 
consequences of international governance beyond anarchy and short of supranational 
government in a given issue,,62, the role of governance in the emerging GIP regime is 
contested between alternate visions for the application of services. Cowhey (1990) notes 
that regime analysis rests on three approaches63 , of which the international power 
approach reflects the influence hegemons have on the regime. This is not to say that 
regime theory has failed to explain an appropriate model of cooperation. Instead, regime 
theory has provided the theoretical framework to explain how states stand to benefit from 
cooperation. Firstly, regimes perform the functions of reducing uncertainty and the costs 
of carrying out transactions for their members. Secondly, international regimes that 
succeed in establishing relatively clear rules that provide standards for judgements of 
behaviour and stabilize expectations (thus reducing uncertainty) will become valued.64 
Effectively, the former will lead to the demand for the creation of international regimes, 
while the latter will lead to the maintenance of international regimes. Hegemonic 
influence aside, regime theory goes about enforcing the "rules of the game" for issues in 
a world system where collective-decision making is scarce. For regimes to fulfil their 
function of creating global governance in issue-specific areas, the creation and 
maintenance of the knowledge that drives the regime can be found in the epistemic 
communities that reinforce the strength of the regime which will be discussed next. 
2.1.2 - The role of epistemic communities 
The composition of regimes owes a lot to the power relations that exist within it. The role 
of epistemic communities has to be recognised within the broader study of regimes. 
"Politicians align with epistemic communities and invite them into the inner circles of 
61 Ibid. pp. 198 
62 Rittberger (1993) pp. 392 
63 Cowhey (1990) pp. 170: "One emphasizes the importance of functions (for example, regimes are 
designed to reduce transaction costs and are shaped by strategic gaming dynamics); another stresses 
international power (regimes are a result of the influence ofa hegemonic power); and a third emphasizes 
cognitive frameworks (regimes influence how actors define problems and their solutions)." 











power. .. Moreover, each community has its own social organization and methods to 
reduce internal coordination problems. For example, the belief that telecommunications 
was a 'natural monopoly' set the agenda for regulation, and international institutions such 
as the ITU provided a social organization (a quasi-corporatist framework) to improve the 
coordination of expectations.,,65 Epistemic communities in the emerging GIP regime are 
explored later in the chapter, but using the telecommunications regimes are useful 
examples of members converging on specific issues to improve coordination. 
As this study deals with a transitionary period in telecommunications governance, it is 
important to mention the process of change in regimes and epistemic communities as new 
sets of institutions and experts significantly alter the rules and principles in the new 
regime. Although change is not a common occurrence in many regimes, the body of 
literature dedicated to it has expanded over time. Shifts in the nature of decision-making 
have far-reaching consequences that ultimately change the complexion of previous 
institutions. "Change can involve not only destruction of existing institutions and the 
creation of new ones but, as in the case of information policy, coordination of 
expectations and perceptions around new focal points.,,66 The importance of change is 
noted by Cowhey (1990), especially in the telecommunications industry; "The rise of a 
new epistemic community comes as a result of political reformers looking for an 
alternative knowledge and communities of knowledge. If an alternative community (a 
"counter-hegemony") can successfully show how to extend its ideas from the domestic to 
the global market, the international regime faces a fonnidable challenge.,,67 With these 
fundamental changes in the institutions and focus of the regime, the transition that took 
place from the international telecommunications regime to the emerging global 
information policy regime is a useful display of regime transition through a change in the 
dominant epistemic community. Despite offering alternatives to understanding global 
governance through institutional structures and offering the opportunity of inclusion to a 
wider range of participants, regime theory has encountered serious criticisms ever since 
its inception. 
65 Cowhey (1990) pg. 173 
66 Braman (2004) pg. 26 











2.1.3 - Criticisms afregime theary 
While regime theory has found support by explaining international cooperation on 
number of levels concerning global issue-areas such as atomic energy and environmental 
issues, its detractors have been quick to point out flaws in the theory. Among the critics, 
was Susan Strange who provided a brief yet concise criticism of regime theory's 
usefulness. Five points were provided that questioned the foundations of regime theory: 
"First, that the study of regimes is, for the most part a fad, one of those shifts of fashion 
not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events in the real world but in itself 
making little in the way of a long-term contribution to knowledge. Second, it is imprecise 
and woolly. Third, it is value-biased, as dangerous as loaded dice. Fourth, it distorts by 
overemphasizing the static and underemphasizing the dynamic element of change in 
world politics. And fifth, it is narrowminded, rooted in a state-centric paradigm that limits 
vision of a wider reality.,,68 
Strange positions her criticism in a political economy perspective and notes that the 
favourable results of a regime are not apparent on the surface. Instead, scholars should 
look at the bargains on which the regime is based to understand who benefits. In a world 
of powerful multinationals and financial organisations, the role of state is not always 
central as corporate entities can direct certain aspects of a regime. 
Probably the most worrymg criticism is noted by Braman (2004) and relates to the 
complexity of regimes: "Emergent systems in the international environment often involve 
such a high degree of causal complexity that traditional modes of analysis may not be 
adequate. Thus some shy away from regime theory simply because it is difficult to 
operationalise.,,69 Despite its complexity, regime theory does provide the necessary 
theoretical tools to conceptualise aspects of international relations. While this brief 
analysis of regime theory has concentrated on a specific aspect of the literature and 
omitted a large portion of its characteristics, it has set an adequate outline by providing a 
clear definition, conceptualisation and criticism for the rest of this study. 
68 Strange, Susan. (1982) "Cave! Hic dragones: a critique of regime analysis" in International Organization 
36, 2. pg. 479 











Despite the specificity of this study, international relations scholars should keep in mind 
that key points are also made in cooperation and regime literature. As Krasner (1991) 
notes, the key question stemming from the need for actors to cooperate rather than defect 
when there are incentives to cheat is: "How can players move toward to Pareto optimal 
outcome of mutual cooperation?". This type of question probes the future of regimes 
within a counter-argument found in a liberal understanding of regimes. However the neo-
realist position of this study is not particularly optimistic given the importance of relative 
gains for sovereign states. As a consequence power relations within the emerging GIP 
regime mirror that of the system where developing countries are subordinate to developed 
countries interests. However, developing countries did promote international coordination 
in the regime because of the relative benefits that were afforded through participation. 
Nevertheless, given the current globalised political environment, the use of regime theory 
signifies a growing trend to recognise the role of multilateral cooperation in international 
relations. Using the above analysis, the following section will have far more clarity as it 
outlines the international telecommunications regime that came to an end in the 1980s. 
2.1.4 - The beginning o/the end/or telecommunication monopolies 
The move toward economic liberalization and the reduction of barriers regarding the flow 
of communications has largely been a late-twentieth century process. As Zacher (cited in 
Rosenau and Singh, 2002) notes, "Through means such as divestiture, deregulation, re-
regulation and privatization, states have transformed their telecommunications services 
industries from tightly controlled monopolies into competitive markets ... the 
liberalization components of the international regime have been shaped by three general 
factors: the capitalist world political economy, the distribution of state power 
(particularly the existence of a dominant state or group of states), and technological 
change.,,7o This international political economy perspective is critical in understanding 
the rise in international institutions such as the WTO. The rise of neolibera1 institutions 
dealt a fatal blow to the domestic monopolies. But the rise of these international 
institutions has also come at a price for developing nations. Policy decisions were 











predominantly nestled in the interests of developed nations and therefore socio-economic 
concerns were relegated off the agenda for developing nations in the interests of joining 
the international economy. 
The international shift toward liberalization in telecommunications shares a similar 
pattern to the deregulation in global capitalist markets that took place in the 1970s. An 
event that is often cited as the most influential toward telecommunication liberalisation is 
the United States' liberalisation of its telecommunications sector that sparked the shift in 
other industrialised countries. Concurrently, the rapid innovations in communication 
technology had accelerated the liberalization process into motion with dramatic effects. 
The profitable 'cartel' between telecommunication fixed-line monopolies and suppliers 
excluded many of the basic tenets that would have made telecommunications universally 
accessible. The following analysis will explore these claims with an account of the 
origins, characteristics and procedures of the international telecommunications regime. 
2.2 - AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGIME 
A central characteristic that writers associate with the international telecommunications 
regime was its ability to stay unchallenged until the 1970s. Cowhey (1990) notes that, 
"like other service industries, telecommunications was traditionally oriented toward 
domestic markets, and competition in both services and equipment was limited. There 
were three important rationales for the system; it would increase reliability in the 
performance of tasks central to the public order. .. would tap economies of scale or scope 
in the provision of services ... and would advance considerations of equity expressed in 
the ideal of 'universal service. ",71 
These rationales put in place a regIme that maintained a profitable 'cartel' for a 
substantial period of time. At a domestic level, the authority over communications was 
controlled by a state-operated monopoly which comprised of the telephone company and 
the government ministry that regulated it. "In addition, countries often mixed their postal 
and telephone services under one operation, which was called the postal, telephone and 











telegraph authority (PTT)."n The combination of these three servIces under one 
government ministry became a common occurrence in many countries that complied with 
the rules of the international telecommunications regime. Singh (cited in Braman, 2004) 
notes that "telecommunications entities historically argued for monopoly control based 
on the claim that economies of scale were necessary to provide services, and they sought 
to recover the costs of these services by targeting institutional users (mostly government 
administrations and large corporate users).,,73 On an international level, bilateral 
negotiations were needed due to the point-to-point nature of international 
telecommunication traffic. These negotiations protected the respective monopolies in the 
two countries but support was needed in an international authoritative mechanism. 
Cowhey (1990) notes that the monopoly-run industries had to gain acceptance in the 
global community: "unless bilateral agreements were covered under a multilateral 
umbrella, they could easily have contradicted each other. .. Therefore, global coordination 
was simplified when a set of umbrella rules and standards was negotiated 
multilaterally.,,74 For the regime to gain legitimacy as an international authority over 
telecommunications decision-making authorities had to be established from which rules 
and principles would emerge. 
2.2.1 ~ Decision-making authorities in the regime 
The origin of the central institution in international telecommunication regime was the 
International Telegraph Union which formed in 1865 in Paris by major Western countries 
with "mandates to facilitate the flow of telegraph transmissions and to improve 
commercial coordination.,,75 The International Telegraph Union later merged with the 
signatories of the International Radio Telegraph Convention to form the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 1932. Without going into a deep description of the 
ITU, its central bodies developed recommendations about telecommunications standards 
and telecommunications facilities and networks and other tasks. The committees were the 
Consultative Committee on Telephones and Telegraph (CCITT), the International 
72 Ibid. 
73 Singh cited in Braman (2004) pp. 88 
74 Cowhey (1990) pp. 175 











Frequency Registration Board and the International Consultative Committee for Radio 
(CCIR). The system prevailed for over half a century with domestic policy geared toward 
the maintenance of the regime until technological innovation stal1ed to erode the 
dominance of the regime's rules. Recognising the parallel process of technological 
development is just as important in understanding the composition of the lTV. Zacher 
notes that "[T]he integration of computer technology with telecommunications also led to 
two pa11icular developments in the 1950s that required extensive international standard 
setting - the introduction of the transoceanic telephone cables and the use of direct 
dialling.,,76 Following the advent of these technological advances the lTV encountered 
serious criticisms as it attempted to set standards for telecommunications. 
As the lTV had to adjust its standard setting, regulation of market access and rates to the 
rapidly evolving nature of technology, its failures and inadequacies became apparent. 
Cowhey (1990) was particularly sceptical, "So far, the ITV in particular sounds like a 
fairly anemic, technical, and dull organization. But under its auspices, the CCITT acted 
as a virtual telephone cartel for the PTTs ... They were the anchor of a regime that 
facilitated bilateral monopolistic bargains, reinforced national monopolies, and limited 
the rights of private finns in the global market.,,77 Zacher re-emphasizes the ITV's 
weaknesses: "The lTV occasionally failed in its attempts at standard setting over the last 
half century, but the key failures concerned consumer products ... that are used for 
communication between services providers and consumers - not between commercial 
finns.,,78 Centrally controlled, socialist and dirigiste states were able to maintain a global 
system of domestic monopolies since they could obstruct efforts toward liberalisation. To 
understand how the international telecommunication regime vis-a-vis the ITV failed in its 
task of providing market access but managed to maintain a cartel for almost a century, an 
analysis of the regime's principles and nonns has to be provided. 
2.2.2 - Exploring norms, rules, principles and decision-making procedures 
76 Ibid. pp. 195 
77 Cowhey (1990) pp. 176 











Cowhey's (1990) thorough analysis of the dominant international telecOlmnunications 
regime paradigm utilises regime theory as its theoretical framework. As mentioned 
earlier, principles, nonns and decision-making procedures are central to regime theory 
and therefore fonn an important part of any study on regimes. The international 
telecommunication regime described above "rested on the principle that monopolies of 
services and equipment were the most efficient and equitable way of providing public 
services both domestically and internationally. This principle assumed state control over 
international telecommunications.,,79 The three resulting nonns from the principle 
maintained the monopolistic character of the regime. The first nonn was jointly provided 
services. International telecommunications at the time, which fell under CCITT rules, 
stipulated that communications were jointly provided services: "This allowed the PTTs to 
argue that communications services did not constitute trade; rather, they were the product 
of a joint investment by two or more nations in a common infrastructure connecting the 
nations. Monopolistic communications authorities were therefore simply extending the 
assumed economies of scale and scope from the domestic network to the international 
arena ... "so The most obvious example of this was in the United States of America, where 
its domestic policies dictated the conduct of the regime. The collaboration between PTTs 
enabled the exchange of services and maintained authority over investments in 
infrastructure. "The regime rule essentially allowed each country's monopoly to charge 
whatever it wanted for originating an international call while paying a fixed fee to the 
receiving country ... Together, these rules made international telephone services 
phenomenally profitable, and it allowed easy monitoring and negotiations for the cartel 
because all marketing deals were largely bilateral."sl 
The status quo among monopolies in the 1960s and 1970s encountered a possible 
challenge with the introduction of satellite technology. By altering the point-to-point 
system of communications, satellite communication would enable one sender to 
communicate with many destinations simultaneously. However, the possibility of a 
79 Cowhey (1990) pg. 177 
so Ibid. 











competitive industry was unlikely as Intelsat82 was owned by national telephone 
monopolies that controlled the interconnection and distribution of satellite services. 
The second norm was standardized networks and equipment. As a means of linking 
national networks and equipment with global universal service, the international 
telecOlmnunications regime required standardization. "This nonn effectively linked the 
provision of services to the operation of the telecommunications equipment market. ,,83 To 
maintain control over the rapid diffusion of digital technologies, the ITU collaborated 
with other international organisations to design packaged services for interconnection. 
Although interconnection received support, there was controversy over the supply of 
telecommunications equipment: "Telephone authorities argued that the design of network 
equipment (central office telephone switches and communication satellites, for example) 
required intimate knowledge of how the network was engineered. These arguments led 
each major country to have a quasi-monopolistic national champion for equipment.,,84 
South Africa provides a useful example of this scenario as its equipment production was 
done domestically through long tenn contracts with South African companies. 
As a result telephone service rates had to carry the significant burden of the regime'S 
decision to cross-subsidise national telephone companies with domestic equipment 
makers. The maintenance of the monopoly was further shielded by the GATT which 
exempted telecommunications equipment85 from competition. The third norm was 
organized global commons. As a visible case of intergovernmental bargaining within ITU 
structures, the norm concerned the allocation of outer space spectrum. "[T]he organizing 
nonn stated that countries should avoid harmful interference with each other's 
transmission or orbiting satellites." 86 
82 According to Braman (2004) the International Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) was coordinated by the US 
military and developed in an environment of monopoly-run telecommunication industries. Heavily 
influenced by its signatories, Intelsat was "unable to impose rules and regulations on private or public 
companies participating in the satellite industry, unless the rules were backed by the governments of the 
signatory countries." pg. 77 
~3 Cowhey (1990) pg. 179 
84 Ibid. 












Despite being on the periphery of regime decision making, developing countries created 
significant tension in the negotiations on the allocation of outer-space spectrum. Fearing 
the dominance of developed countries in the allocation, developing countries were 
adamant that future provisions be made for their inclusion. 
As regime theory indicates, principles and norms were further enhanced by rules and 
decision making procedures. As a means of reinforcing the authority of PTTs, the ITU 
had three sets 0 f rules which were: "the legally binding international law laid down in 
the ITU Convention, the regulations set forth by administrative conferences and the 
recOlmnendations prepared for plenary assemblies of the CCITT and CCIR, which are 
not legally binding but enjoy wide acceptance."S7 Despite the major criticisms by 
Cowhey (1990) and Zacher (cited in Rosenau and Singh, 2002) levelled at the ITU 
regarding standard setting, it did promote a one-nation, one-vote system that favoured 
developing countries thus reducing US dominance. Intelsat's decision-making structures 
differed markedly as voting was based on a country's share of total use of the system. 
"For many years, the United States had more than 50 percent share of the total votes; 
therefore, to prevent a unilateral U.S decision on important questions, Intelsat was forced 
to require that approval be based on more than a simple majority vote."ss 
Despite attempts to minimise its power, the United States and other industrialised nations 
still dominated Intelsat. The international telecommunication regime was thus 
characterised by two institutions that legitimised the involvement of government agencies 
in shaping the international telecommunications market. Within international relations the 
subject is clearly defined by Zacher: "Mercantilist thinking (including fears of economic 
vulnerability) had an important influence on the international capitalism of the day, and 
definitely impeded certain dimensions of commercialliberalization."s9 The centralization 
of power in the state meant that challenges to the monopolistic structure of the 
telecommunications sector went unchallenged. States from all over the world subscribed 
to these norms, principles and decision-making procedures including South Africa whose 
PTT (South African Posts and Telecommunications - SAPT) operated in the 
~7 Ibid. pg. 181 
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monopolistic manner described above. Chapter Four expands fully on how this was done. 
On an international level, central authorities reinforced the interests of the developed 
nations therefore leading to weak competition. However, a combination of global 
economic and political factors signalled a change in this fonnidable setup. 
2.3 - THE REGIME COMES UNDER PRESSURE 
Signs of a transition in the international telecommunications regime began during the 
1960s as pressure mounted on the United States government and internal private 
constituencies to allow competition against its telecom monopoly. Rosenau and Singh 
(2002) maintain that the move toward liberalisation has important roots in the United 
States. Three changes are highlighted as being central to the change; "First, pressure 
developed from multinational corporations to lease lines from the monopoly providers so 
that they could obtain cheaper and better customized services ... Second, ways were found 
by some international telecommunications finns such as AT&T to bypass the monopoly 
finns in foreign countries so they did not have to accept the rate structures of those 
foreign monopolies ... Third, international consortia of finns from different countries 
began to develop since the member finns judged that they could best pursue their own 
interests by cooperating.,,9o It is important to note that the regime did not collapse when 
confronted by these transformative pressures, instead it persisted with the monopoly-run 
industry until the 1980s. As pressure mounted from the concurrent developments in 
technology, the regime's nonns, rules and principles began to be undennined. The rules 
of the ITU were coming under increased non-compliancy as increased liberalisation led 
to competition and a relaxed trading environment between states. By the 1990s, 
liberalisation had made an important leap through the WTO General Agreement on Trade 
and Services (GATS). "Of considerable importance is that it required transparency with 
regard to states' competition and protection policies ... At the time of the signing the 
agreements, and immediately thereafter, the developing countries did not support the 
provisions regarding telecommunications; but in the long run it is going to be difficult for 
them to reject the rules.,,91 The international political economy of the time included a 
90 Ibid. pg. 199 - 200. 











global change in trade policy. The rise of neoliberalism was further entrenched with the 
powerful political figures of Ronald Reagan of the United States and Margaret Thatcher 
of England endorsing an open and competitive system of economics. The details of this 
shift exceed the constraints of this study and this short explanation should not detract 
from the importance these countries had in promoting the origins of the current neoliberal 
political economy. Additionally, advancements in technology contributed to cracks 
emerging in the international telecommunications regime because digital and satellite 
services provided alternative technologies that could bypass the legacy of fixed-line 
monopolies. 
2.3.1 - The parallel process of technological change 
The argument for technological change influencing an end to the old regime is further 
emphasised by Strange (1996). "In the last decade or so, a rapid decline in this power has 
set in, set off by a combination of technological change, demand in the market and policy 
changes in the United States driven by the economic ideology of private enterprise.,,92 
Strange (1996) also identifies the five critical changes in technology which include 
improvements in transmission systems, large digital switches, wireless communication 
through cellular phones, earth-circling satellites and finally, rapid developments in 
computer technology. These factors combined along with American de-regulation shifted 
the telecommunications industry toward open markets. This is illustrated by the rise of 
transnational operating firms that have dominated communications systems in a number 
of countries. But what effect did this have on the regime? Strange (1996) notes the 
consequences: "What is perhaps more controversial is how these changes have affected 
international 'regimes' as reflected in inter-governmental organisations. Much of the 
relevant literature tends to underplay the dynamic forces working on these organisations. 
In telecommunications the question is whether, through them, US structural power is 
being converted into relational power over other states, legitimated by economic 
orthodoxy.,,93 Strange's concerns about the hegemonic role the US would take, are 
expressed in a similar manner by other authors. There was also a constant concern about 
92 Strange, Susan., (1996) The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the Warld Economy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) pg. 100 











the representation developing countries would have in the ITU. The role of the state was 
slowly diminishing as transnational businesses were becoming central in the 
telecommunication environment. Keeping in mind that this study is looking at South 
Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime, the process of technological change is 
crucial in understanding the international nature of decision making structures. Despite 
being in favour of a developmental approach for the regime, South Africa's eligibility to 
gain the most out of the regime coincides with liberalising its telecom industry. 
2.4 - THE EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION POLICY REGIME 
As the emerging GIP regime is reinforced by the multitude of international actors and 
rapidly changing technologies, its features and operationalisation have characterised it as 
a functioning regime. The following description recognises that principles, norms, rules 
and decision making procedures have been fonned under the guidance of a central 
institution (WTO). Therefore the emerging GIP regime possesses the rules and 
conventions made by actors who have coordinated their policies to avoid mutually 
undesirable outcomes. This section will explore the origins of emerging GIP regime in 
detail and identify the power relations that exist between developed and developing 
countries in the information economy. As the volume of literature on the emerging GIP 
regime is increasing, a focus on the digital divide and the power relations that exist within 
it provides an argument for this study as mentioned earlier. As with the international 
telecommunications regime, the emerging GIP regime has had a noticeable effect on 
domestic telecommunication policy. Moves toward liberalisation and privatisation of 
their respective telecommunications sectors have meant states cannot avoid the need to 
alter their policies to the neoliberal environment. The literature on regimes note that the 
origin of the emerging GIP regime are yet to be clearly defined as influential forces such 
as multinationals, politicians and powerful states converged on the shift at roughly the 
same time. 
Given the multitude non-state actors, the emerging GIP regime is partly reflective of the 
neoliberal political economy that is underpinned by global commerce. With multinational 











through lobbying m their respective developed nations, the liberalisation of 
telecommunications has made international governance a more inclusive affair. The 
distinction between the numbers of actors in the emerging GIP regime compared to the 
international telecommunications regime is important to recognise as fixed-line 
monopolies and government ministries are now competing with a flurry of international 
telecommunications companies and mobile operators. 
The plural nature of governance and authority structures in the emerging GIP regime is 
an example of the continued shift away from a state-centric system. Strange's (1996) 
remarks that these policy changes were "legitimised by the economic ideology of private 
enterprise,,94 provides a consensual realisation that the emerging GIP regime is a product 
of the neoliberal economic system. By using regime theory as a theoretical framework, 
the complex interactions between state and society domestically, as well as between 
international organisations and the states internationally, are understood through its 
nonns, principles, rules and decision making procedures. 
2.4.1 - Ac?justing principles, norms, values and decision-making procedures 
The key to understanding the difference between the two regimes lies in the emerging 
GIP regime's principles, nonns and values. Cogburn (2003) provides a brief yet precise 
account of the emerging GIP regime's features as it negotiates itself toward becoming a 
regime. Cogburn (2003) attributes the creation of the principles to high-level meetings 
that took place at international conferences. Out of these conferences emerged eight key 
organising principles that came to be known as the "Brussels Principles,,95 (see Appendix 
B). Out of these principles, a number of common themes emerged that outlined the 
direction of the emerging GIP regime. "First, the importance of the role of the private 
sector in stimulating dynamic competition and attracting the private sector to invest in the 
infrastructure and applications for the Infonnation Society, and an attempt to move 
towards universal service. Second, using a strategic policy approach to stimulate the 
development of an Infonnation Society, with an appropriate legal and regulatory 
94 Strange (1996) pg. 100 
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framework. A third principle is that of working to stimulate the creation of content that is 
relevant to and reflective of many of the world's countries, cultures and languages. A 
final common principle emerging out of these important conferences is the idea of using 
the potential of an Information Society to stimulate employment creation.,,96 For the 
purposes of this study, the second principle will be expanded upon given the international 
relevance of its function. Applied in the fonn of the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications, this regulatory approach merges the interests of state and non-state 
actors through the WTO. 
Since the emerging GIP regime has to take into consideration the wide variety of its 
stakeholders, its norms, values and principles has had to accommodate the vested 
interests in electronic commerce by dominant stakeholders. These include multinational 
corporations (Google, Microsoft, etc.) and international organisations that have an 
enforcement capacity to implement rules and principles of the emerging GIP regime. 
These include the WTO, World Intellectual Property Organisation, ICANN, World Bank 
and Aid agencies. Cogburn (2003) supplies a list of fifteen norms and values that stress 
the nature of the new regime97 . The following table is a list of norms along with 
explanations found in the emerging GIP regime that are in contrast to the norms found in 
the international telecommunications regime: 





(3) Electronic payments 
96 Cogburn (2003) pg. 139 - 140 
97 Ibid. pg. 140 - 141 
and infonnation 
Norms Explained 
The emerging principle focuses on the importance 
of liberalization, 
privatization and a pro-competitive 
telecommunications environment 
Principle that the Internet and e-commerce should 
continue to be a "tax free" zone 
The emerging principle that multiple and competing 
options for e-payments should continue to be 











interoperable, and should allow for both 
anonymous, pseudonymous, and traceable methods 
(4) Commercial code A common global commercial code should emerge 
to provide for the global rule of law and protection 
for contracts and private property 
(5) Intellectual property protection IPR regulation needs to be revised to reflect the 
realities ofthe digital economy, while still providing 
an incentive for the production of infonnation goods 
(6) Domain names Domain names are an important and contested 
commercial asset, and famous marks should be 
protected while not allowing them to abuse smaller 
enterprises, and that ICANN is the legitimate body 
charged with the responsibility to deal with domain 
name issues 
(7) Personal data Should be protected, while at the same time 
allowing for legitimate corporate uses of data 
profiling and targeted advertising 
(8) Security and encryption Is an important national and personal security 
concern that has to be balanced with personal 
privacy concerns 
(9) Awareness/trust Is a limiting factor for the growth of e-commcrce 
(10) Trust Might be enhanced with the widespread use of 
authentication and digital signatures 
(II) Technical standards Should be technology neutral and industry driven to 
the fullest extent possible 
(12) Local content Should be promoted and protected, if e-commerce is 
going to reach its full potential 
(13) Labour and society Will be affected by the move towards a digital 
economy and society should work to minimize the 
negative impact, while harnessing the potential 
(14) Universal service/access Or lack thereof, as characterized by the "digital 
divide" is one of the most potentially limiting 
factors for global e-commerce 











Table 2 above highlights not only the nonns of the emerging GIP regime but also reflects 
the dominant electronic commerce approach of the regime. The focus on electronic 
payments, domain names and taxation indicate that prerogatives of the emerging GIP 
regime have left the developmental ambitions far behind. A worrying factor about this is 
that the gap in the digital divide will grow, leaving a large number of people alienated 
from the information economy that the world is rapidly progressing toward. 
Decision-making procedures in the emerging GIP regime are primarily developed by the 
WTO. As mentioned in chapter one, the WTO and a host of other non-governmental 
organisations are the authority in the new regime. These stakeholders not only 
represented some of the most powerful organisations in the world but many were also 
based in heavily industrialised countries. The consequence that many authors of the 
digital divide note is a shift of the locus of power further away from developing 
countries: "Perhaps most important amongst these developments for the emergence of 
this new regime is the role played by the WTO and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). The WTO is clearly going to be the centrepiece organisation in this 
emerging GIl regime. Many of the most important aspects of telecommunications have 
already been ceded to the WTO, particularly under the GATS agreement, which has 
already had an impact on governing the global trade in services.,,98 Despite the 
dominance of the developed countries and organisations "the emerging regime will rely 
on a host of governmental and non-governmental organizations to enforce its rules.,,99 
The pluralism involved in the new regime was an encouraging sign of the transition away 
from the state based monopolies as competition would be introduced and stimulate 
innovation and a degree of independent regulation. Poorer countries would also attract 
much needed foreign investment to address the skills shortage. However, the introduction 
of new stakeholders did little to change global power dynamics between developed and 
developing countries as privatisation often took preference over the liberalisation process. 
Organised around the interests of developed countries, the commerce approach of the 
98 Ibid. pg. 158 











emerging GIP regime placed developing counties in a predicament. The example this 
study utilises is South Africa, which had to carefully balance its policies to fit 
international trade objectives while servicing its underprivileged citizens. Chapters three 
and four provide a focus discussion on the role of the international agreement and the 
implications it had for developing countries. 
With the rules, norms and principles outlined in Table 2, the focus on the emerging GIP 
regime shifts to an important characteristic in the context of this study. As mentioned 
earlier, a significant debate within the emerging GIP regime is centred on the contested 
vision for the regime. Cogburn (cited in Braman, 2004) notes that "On the one hand, 
there is a broad vision for the GIl that would focus on using its potential to maximise 
social-welfare and socioeconomic development. This vision is promoted largely by 
stakeholders in developing countries (such as South Africa, Egypt and Malaysia) and the 
international development community (the ITU, United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa [ECA], the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
[ECLAC], Canada and some sections of the European Commission [ECl .. On the other 
hand, there is a more narrow vision for the GIl that would focus on its potential for 
economic growth and development. This vision is promoted by another group of 
stakeholders, located largely in the United States and other economically developed 
countries and organisations."lOo Well documented in the digital divide literature, 
contested visions pose serious problems for countries such as South Africa looking to 
gain the most out of electronic commerce but also aiming to provide universal access to 
i ts citizens. 
The problem manifests itself in the form of commercial interests that neglect much 
needed areas of development in favour of areas where profitability would be high. Less 
involvement by government due to liberalisation and privatisation effectively leave the 
telecommunications sector in the hands of foreign profit-seeking firms that reduce the 
emphasis on the social objective of providing universal access/ service. Although this 
problem is not unsolvable, it does affect the regime as it navigates its way toward a 











global infonnation economy. Therefore the following section will expand more on the 
epistemic communities that ultimately drive governance issues in the emerging GIP 
regime. 
2.4.2 - Power relations in the emerging GIP regime 
In a broader sense, the digital divide had become a concern in developed countries as 
well. In fact, Wilson (2004) notes that: "Beginning in 1999, there was a veritable 
explosion of private-sector interest in the digital divide and other distributional dilemma. 
These high-level expressions of private-sector interest in the digital divide were 
unprecedented."IOI Wilson provides a brief description of the four forces that stimulated 
the renewed interest. The four forces were (1) fonnal meetings on the divide at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, (2) a new campaign on digital opportunity that was launched 
by leading corporations under the banner of the Global Business Dialogue (Electronic 
Commerce), (3) a Digital Opportunity Task (DOT) Force of leading global ICT 
companies and other nongovernmental groups tasked to provide recommendations to the 
G8, and (4) the Global Information Infrastructure Commission's (GIIC) drive to put the 
divide at the top of its agenda. But has this interest from powerful international 
organisations lost momentum within the regime? Cogburn's (2004) study of elite 
decision-making and epistemic communities investigates the stakeholders that influence 
the regime and attempts to verify which vision will direct the regime. 
As a consequence of its influential stakeholders, the emerging GIP regime has had to deal 
with the dominance of the electronic commerce approach in the GIS. Despite conferences 
held to promote the developmental aspect of the infonnation society, such as the World 
Summit on the Infonnation Society, the tendency toward electronic commerce has tended 
to dominate. "Currently, the GIIC activities are organised into three 'committees': 
infrastructure development, electronic commerce and education. Structurally, all of these 
committees are in fact designed to support the continued growth and development of 
global electronic commerce."I02 This is not difficult to understand as sustainability in the 
101 Wilson (2004) pg. 337 











infonnation age rested with the profits of online companies such as Microsoft, Amazon, 
Google and Yahoo! These multi-billion dollar corporations have driven research and 
development of hardware and software to a level that can influence the commerce-driven 
approach of the emerging GIP regime. The widespread liberalisation of the telecom 
industry has meant that these companies can now outsource their services and support 
capabilities and create a global industry in itself. Their influence has also flowed into the 
decisions that powerful states take in fostering the necessary environment to tap into 
these profits. 
At an organisational level, the intention of the United States' private sector not to support 
the ITU as an international forum was made at the beginning of the liberalisation trend in 
the emerging GIP regime. According to Cogburn (cited in Braman, 2004), the ITU was 
perceived as being a mouthpiece for developing countries. As an alternative, private 
sector support tended toward the WTO and ICANN. "Western governments are actively 
supporting their TNCs in the ICT and telecommunications sector by influencing the rules 
of the international regulatory regime ... Most Western governments are therefore trying 
to set the agenda of international institutions such as the G7, the OECD, the WTO, the 
World Bank and the ITu.,,]03 Given the broad nature of the emerging GIP regime and the 
number of relevant actors involved, concerns have been raised about the elite-centred 
decisions that have taken place in the emerging GIP regime. Cogburn (2004) notes that 
the problem with weak developing country influence is that "it appears that the lack of 
influence stems from the inability of developing countries and the international 
development community to influence the episteme, or fundamental knowledge, upon 
which the regime is built and to master the multiple processes of global regime 
fonnation.,,]04 Despite the process of globalisation flattening hierarchies and increasing 
decentralisation, the exclusionary tactics that Cogburn (2004) discusses are largely due to 
elites influencing international policy negotiations. This elite-driven process largely 
operates in the halls of international conferences: 
103 Audenhove et al. (1999) pg. 395 











"These conferences can help to develop and promote the principles, values, nonns and, 
on occasion, even rules for an emerging global regime by facilitating the spread of 
knowledge and promoting convergence of expectations amongst this diverse group of 
stakeholders."lo5 The potential these conferences have to stimulate the fonnation of 
epistemic communities has become apparent over time. In the context of the emerging 
GIP regime, these conferences have developed the epistemic communities for the 
contesting visions of the regime. 
As much of this study has discussed, the line has clearly been drawn between the 
contesting visions of electronic commerce and social development. With the WTO 
backing the interests of electronic commerce, its position of power has been increased 
relative to the ITU. But how can developing countries possibly compete in such an 
environment? Cogburn suggests that: "if we are to maximise the GIl as a platfonn for 
socio-political development and economic growth, increased levels of global 
participation are required. This must go beyond access to these elite decision-making 
processes by the diverse voices of the developing world and the international 
development community to include finding ways to enhance their ability to influence the 
epistemic communities and knowledge networks.,,106 
The probability of developing countries re-organising the power centres of the emerging 
GIP regime are weak, but having been signatories on the WTO Basic Agreement on 
Telecommunications does provide some optimism. South Africa's role in the emerging 
GIP regime is characteristic of the experience many developing countries are dealing 
with. Representation at the decision-making conferences is more of a symbolic gesture 
than constructive negotiation therefore leaving the interests of developing countries 
sidelined to priorities of an electronic commerce global framework. With Western 
European, Japanese and American interests at the heart of the electronic approach to the 
emerging GIP regime, South Africa's interests of social development through ICT clash 
with the rules that are fonning in the decision-making structures of the regime. This 
105 Ibid. pg. 161 











tussle is explored in chapter four. However, the theoretical base of this study notes that in 
the realist tradition of regime theory, states can cooperate through agreed-upon rules of 
conduct but that the regime is dependent on the hegemon to support the infrastructure and 
compel members to contribute to the maintenance of the regime. Additionally, the 
cooperation that takes place is based on the assumption that states are rational and act 
only to further their own interests. This explains why the power dynamics in the 
emerging GIP regime are distorted since rational actors do not act on behalf of the 
common interest, which amounts to a failure to provide the group with a public good. 
Olsen (cited in Hasenclever et aI, 1996) sums up that "in the absence of coercion or 
additional inducements beyond the potential benefits of the public good itself, large 
groups will fail to produce collective goods.,,]07 In this case, the hegemon has directed the 
interests of the regime away from developmental objectives leaving South Africa to deal 
with a balancing act between international trade agreements and national development 
objectives. 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide the theoretical base for understanding certain 
aspects of the above mentioned regimes. In the context of this study, power relations and 
the composition of the ruling structures were focussed on. This was important as the 
research question focuses on South Africa's response to a regime that is predominantly 
concerned with interests of industrialised countries. Another aspect was the influence 
collective action among state and non-state actors have on domestic policy. This tussle 
between state objectives and international trade objectives was a theme that was 
mentioned but will be explored in the case-study analysis. With a descriptive analysis of 
both the international telecommunications regime and the emerging GIP regime, the 
transformed rules, principles and decision-making procedures now require a specific 
focus that links the impact of agreements with developing countries such as South Africa. 
The following chapter deals with the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and 
the possibilities that exist for developing countries in the information economy. Despite 
the emerging GIP regime leaning toward commerce, the next chapter will explore 











whether developing countries have the possibility to balance the objectives of economic 












THE REGimE HAS TEETH: E:-:PLORlnG THE 
WTO AGREEmEnT on BASIC 
TELEcommuniCATions 
The previous two chapters have attempted to outline a specific argument in a fairly broad 
field of subject matter. By navigating a path through the regime theory literature and 
locating an argument that questions the direction of the emerging GIP regime in a realist 
framework, this chapter will discuss the tool used to implement the rules of the emerging 
GIP regime. This discussion will explain how states - like South Africa - are compelled 
to liberalise their telecommunications sectors because of their commitments to the rules 
of the emerging GIP regime. A brief investigation into the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications provides the context in which developing countries are engaging in 
the emerging GIP regime. By emphasising the important role the WTO plays in 
establishing the rules, norms and principles of the emerging GIP regime, it is possible to 
understand what procedures and agreements are central to this international 
organisation's role as the regulatory authority. 
The purpose of such an exercise is to continue the line of thought this study has been 
attempting to establish. With chapter one setting the conceptual boundaries and research 
direction of developing countries in the 'digital divide', chapter two went about using 
specific elements of a theory to guide the research on regimes by highlighting power 
relations that exist within them. By using a descriptive analysis of the international 
telecommunications regime and the emerging global information policy regime to 
highlight their differences, this study went about locating key characteristics and 
epistemic communities that led each regime in a certain direction. Recognising the power 
relations between developed and developing countries has not only served to explain 
regime dynamics but also provided the context in which the WTO's agreements should 
be understood. As the central organisation that effectively controls the regime, the WTO 











of globalisation enhancing the importance of communication technology, the regulations 
agreed to under the WTO framework is crucial in understanding the progression of power 
relations in the emerging GIP regime. 
3.1 - The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
As noted in the regime theory analysis, decision-making procedures - along with norms 
and rules - define the way states interact on certain issues. The WTO Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications is a display of states cooperating in the emerging GIP regime. 
The agreements that are discussed below represent specific agreements that have evolved 
out of consultations between the many stakeholders involved in the regime. By 
recognising the need to liberalise global telecommunications, the WTO's drafting of the 
telecommunications agreement demonstrated collective action amongst states toward the 
liberalisation of their telecommunications sectors. As one of the most dominant 
organisation in the emerging GIP regime, the WTO - utilising its General Agreement on 
Trade and Services 108 - set out to establish rules governing trade in basic 
telecommunications service. These services include109: 
• Voice telephone services (local and long distance); 
• Packet-switched data transmission services; 
• Circuit-switched data transmission services; 
• Telex services; 
• Telegraph services; 
• Facsimile services 
As a process that began in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) Uruguay 
Round in 1984, where initial proceedings went about setting up the GATS, the General 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications was the end result of over a decade of 
108 Rosenau and Singh (2002) note that GATS was particularly important in telecommunications 
governance. "Fonnally, GATS consists of 29 articles, 8 annexes and 130 schedules of commitments. The 
annexures cover specific sectors, including telecommunications. GATS is enforceable by the newly-created 
dispute settlement body of the WTO and overseen by one of the three new councils established, the Council 
for Trade in Services." pg. 252 












negotiations to provide both a measure of the extent of telecommunications liberalisation 
in its member countries, and a mechanism for deepening commitments by these countries 
to liberalise their sectors 1 10. Table 3 is provided to show how the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications is an integral part to the global trade in services. It represents the 
framework from which liberalising principles are formed on a global level. 
Table 3. The development of telecommunications commitments in the GATS structure 
GATS STRUCTURE APPLICABILITY TO TELECOMS 





Annexes Telecommunications Annex: 
- Members have to supply access to 
and use of Public 
Telecommunications Transport 
Networks and Services 
- Members have to ensure 
transparency 
- Members have to be technically 
cooperative 
- Members must recognise role of 
international organisations 
Schedules of Commitments Market Access 
National Treatment 
Reference Paper on Regulatory Principles 
Source: Adapted from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/12-teCe.htm and 
Tuthill (2003) pg. 15 
Having been formulated in the multilateral structures of the WTO, the principles in the 
Reference Paper are designed to address fundamental telecommunications areas such as 
basic services. "On 5 February 1998, the Fourth Protocol, establishing rules governing 
the future trade in basic telecommunications services, came into force. That the focus of 
this agreement is on basic services is significant. For while value-added services were 
subject to the existing GATS, basic telecommunications services such as local, long-











distance and possibly international servIces, were not. "III The implication of basic 
services falling under GATS meant that anti-competitive practices of the incumbents 
would come under close scrutiny as the non-negotiable introduction of liberalisation by 
signatories would break down the barriers set up by high interconnectionl12 costs. 
Lowering the costs of access to the incumbent's facilities had to be central to the 
principles if competition would be possible. For a developing country such as South 
Africa, the change of rules governing basic services enables the crucial twin processes of 
(a) allowing new entrants access to the incumbents network so that they can resell 
services and (b) that competitive voice, data and wireless carriers can have access to the 
"last mile" facilities to deliver services to end users. It is at the "last mile" point that 
bottlenecks often occur, therefore requiring interconnection to be fair and affordable. The 
gradual introduction of competition is crucial for the sector as it attracts much-needed 
investment and lowers access costs for users. The process is not as straight-forward 
though as South Africa has learnt during its reform period. A number of factors such as 
strong regulation and the absence of unnecessary political intervention are important for 
the trade in telecommunications to run smoothly. 
By having telecommunications become a basic servIce, the opportunity for the 
infonnation society to incorporate developing countries became a reality. The importance 
of services has become increasingly important in the neoliberal political economy. 
According to Zacher (2002) trade in services currently accounts for 25 percent of 
international trade. I 13 Previously viewed as a non-tradable entity due to its intangibility, 
telecommunications services have become vital for providers of a dependent good since 
communications with the market is crucial for effective commerce. The importance of 
III Henderson, A., Gentle, I. and Ball, E. (2005) "WTO principles and telecommunications in developing 
nations: challenges and consequences of accession" in Telecommunications Policy (29) pg. 205 - 206 
112 Interconnection allows new market entrants access to the network of an established or monopoly 
provider. Shared access to customers occurs through interconnection, and access to all customers is 
necessary both for successful entry and for continued competition. If the incumbent, with the vast majority 
of customers, does not interconnect with new entrants, it is unlikely that the new entrants will remain 
economically viable. The price of interconnection (or transport and termination), for example, could serve 
as a significant barrier to entry for new networks. An incumbent monopolist has an incentive to demand a 
high price to terminate calls originating on a new entrant's network and pay nothing for calls originating on 
its own network. (http://www.cybertelecom.orglbroadbandlintercon.htm - accessed 21 November, 2007) 











regulating services has increased and has been reinforced in the GATS (see Table 3). 
Under the WTO umbrella, GATS defines services as belonging to four categories: 
• Services provided across national borders; 
• Services consumed abroad; 
• Services for which a commercial presence is required; and 
• Services through the presence of a natural person. 1 14 
In the case of telecommunications, many nations realised the strategic importance that 
low-cost access would have on their competitive success. While GATS emphasised the 
role of liberalisation and the reduction of anti-competitive behaviour m 
telecommunications through its Articles VIII and IX, developing countries feared the 
allocation and provision of essential services to foreign entities. "Among the fears 
expressed then, and indeed today, are that any agreement would threaten the right of 
governments to maintain public services, that liberalisation of service markets under the 
WTO effectively means deregulation, and that foreign investment in the supply of 
services tends to lead to the development of the relevant local service industry being held 
back."lls These fears aside, developing countries had to be involved in the Agreement 
due to the importance of low-cost telecommunications in domestic and international 
contexts. 
Enforced by a set of interrelated Agreements and Annexes such as the Annex on 
Telecommunications, the Fourth Protocol on Basic Communications and the Reference 
Paper on Regulatory Principles (RP), the WTO provided the opportunity for 
telecommunication development across many nations. The nature of these agreements 
was to introduce competition into the telecommunications arena. "This rationale is 
particularly relevant in the WTO context where the effective and competitive global trade 
in goods and services is the focus with access provided to developing nations on an equal 
basis with more developed nations. It follows that access to communications services is 












essential to enable developing nations to compete on the world stage.,,116 The following 
brief analysis will explain how these agreements operate. 
To improve market access and the national treatment of foreign telecom providers, the 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications included 55 schedules of specific 
commitments. Signatories to the agreement (out of the 69 that signed, 40 were 
developing countries), could detennine the level of liberalisation on their 
telecommunications services sector. Whether it was local-distance services or mobile 
telephony, members were encouraged to make their telecommunications service sectors 
competitive. "Moreover, almost all the signatories to the ABT [Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications] included additional commitments concerning regulatory principles 
in their schedules. These regulatory principles are included in the Reference Paper, a 
short document negotiated in 1996. Most members took the binding commitments on 
these regulatory principles by including the Reference Paper in their schedule of 
commitments (in the additional commitments section).,,117 Of central importance to the 
themes this study is analysing, is the Reference Paper which manages the issue of 
monopolistic incumbents holding up competition in a liberalised environment. The 
Reference Paper (also known as the Fourth Protocol) was a critical part of the 
liberalisation and regulatory process. "The widespread adoption of the RP is arguably the 
most important lubricant to the mechanics of the GATS and the realization of its 
objectives in telecommunications trade liberalization.,,118 Despite being a guideline, the 
Reference Paper addresses the problem of monopolies relinquishing their interests in 
domestic markets through a transparent regulatory framework. Dealing with these 
domestic barriers, the Reference Paper was divided into five sections. They were: 
1. Anticompetitive behaviour regarding sharing of technical infonnation; 
2. Interconnection of new entrants into the telecommunications market; 
3. The administration of universal service obligations; 
4. Transparency regarding the licensing process; and 
116 Ibid. pg. 208 
117 Blouin, c., (2000) "The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications: a reevaluation" in 
Telecommunications Policy (24). pg. 137 











5. A commitment to ensure the independence and impartiality of the regulatory 
body. 
The Reference Paper is not without faults, as authors such as Cohen (2001), Henderson et 
al. (2005) and others point out. General concerns are grouped into two central criticisms 
of the Reference Paper. Both are of equal importance and in South Africa's case, have 
been to the detriment of its telecommunications sector. The first deals with the lack of 
precision of the Reference Paper. This vagueness and high level of generality are most 
concerning in the areas of interconnection where the Reference Paper fails to "specify a 
costing basis, the degree to which networks have to be unbundled and whether a regulator 
can enforce an interconnection agreement.,,119 These factors have left the Reference 
Paper open to interpretation by the national incumbents who have capitalised on 
ambiguity of certain principles and furthered their position as the major-supplier of 
servIces. 
The second criticism feeds off the first as it recognises that it is difficult to enforce vague 
rules 120. The low level of particularity has meant that anti-competitive practices can be 
continued as exclusivity periods (without regulated accounting mechanisms) give 
incumbents the flexibility needed to phase in commitments at their will. Facing these 
challenges, the Reference Paper has been interpreted by scholars as being a crucial set of 
commitments that facilitate the introduction of competition, but flawed in ensuring 
compliance. Although the structures exist to monitor implementation such as dispute 
settlements structures and trade policy reviews, the Reference Paper is obligated to 
respect the rights and regulatory autonomy of sovereign nations. This is important as 
developed and developing nations stress the need to manage their domestic affairs 
without the intrusion of neoliberal arrangements. However, the Reference Paper is still 
part of a fairly recent set of Agreements and will therefore take time to adjust to the wide 
range of domestic arrangements it accommodates in its generality. 
119 Ibid. pg. 739 











Having been created in a multilateral forum with input from a number of countries, the 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications may give nations the opportunity to manage 
their own liberalisation programmes but is also subject to international and domestic 
problems in the form of profit-driven foreign finns and domestic operators protecting 
their monopoly. It is therefore important to explore the proposed benefits for developing 
countries as they negotiate the pros and cons of the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
3.2 ~ Questioning the benefits ofthe WTO agreement (or developing countries 
Before an analysis of how developing countries have fared as a result of the Agreement 
on Basic Telecommunications, it is necessary to step back and look at the role developing 
countries played in the negotiations leading up to the Agreement. As mentioned before, 
the international relations standpoint this study has taken is located within the hegemonic 
stability theory strand of regime theory. This neo-realist understanding notes that states 
are compelled to participate in the regime by a hegemon and are interested in their 
relative gains. This point lends itself to the discussion on developing country involvement 
in the negotiations leading up to the Agreement. Interestingly, developing countries were 
not completely marginalised in an environment where developed countries are often 
dominant. Instead, as briefly documented below, developing world representation and 
influence was evident in the negotiations. Following on, this study investigates the 
consequences of developing country accession to the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
Northern versus Southern hemisphere negotiations is recognised in international relations 
scholarship as a being skewered toward industrialised northern states. The legacy of 
exploitation by the North and consequent corruption in the South has left a massive 
power imbalance between the two. However, given the dynamic possibility leTs have to 
alter those power relations along with widespread liberalisation in global markets since 
the 1970s, the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, according to Singh (2002), was 
negotiated under different conditions. There are two contentions about developing world 











developing countries have the opportunity to leapfrog stages of development so that they 
can engage in the infonnation age. The second contention is that developing countries 
continue to be at the mercy of developed countries and powerful multinational 
corporations. This would effectively rule out any influence at decision-making in 
multilateral negotiations. Both contentions affect developing countries to a certain degree 
and an example of this is displayed by the power relations between developing and 
developed countries in the emerging GIP regime. A useful illustration of developing 
country coordination (in a realist tradition) is seen in the gains made during negotiations. 
As Singh (2002) notes, developing countries did make significant gains at the bargaining 
table. Developing countries ensured that: 
1. Their participation in the negotiations ensured that they could influence the 
agenda in their favour; 
2. That having moved away from inward-oriented investment policies allowed 
global investment; 
3. That they could phase 111 the commitments into their domestic policies 111 a 
sequenced fashion; and 
4. That a one-size-fits all package was avoided due to the fact that commitments 
could be made in several sub-issue areas. 121 
This effectively slowed down the pace of transition so that developing countries would 
not encounter a "shock therapy" plan of liberalisation. 
How did these achievements come about? As a recent trend in global politics has shown, 
the rise of South-South cooperation has started to alter power relations among developed 
and developing countries. In the case ofICT, the newly liberalised markets of developing 
countries were able to negotiate a more inclusive approach by using certain strategies. 
The first strategy was inclusion and agenda setting which enabled developing countries to 
influence the agenda in the WTO, making their presence felt. The second strategy was 
trade-offs and issue linkages in which Singh notes that "the fact that countries were 
making several different types of sub-offers within the rubric of the WTO telecom 
negotiations, which themselves were part of the GATS framework allowing several types 











of commitments and exemptions, allowed them to tailor the agreement to their context to 
a large extent.,,122 The third strategy included coalition building, between developing 
countries and strategic companies and governments from industrialised countries, which 
gave developing countries assistance in the WTO negotiations. Finally, by using 
technocratic and legalistic strategies, developing countries were able to negotiate on 
terms that were on par with developed countries. Given the advantages of being able to 
negotiate with greater influence, developing countries were given the opportunity to 
participate in global rule and norm formation. In the context of this study, exploring the 
purpose of these strategies and developing country participation is important in 
understanding how the emerging GIP regime accommodates a wide range of interests 
despite being aligned to the electronic commerce approach. As an indication of the 
applicability of regime theory, the inclusion of developing countries interests 
demonstrates that coordination in the international system is possible between sovereign 
nation-states. The strategies used, emphasises the theoretical argument that this study has 
established by noting that coordination among states serves their interests rather than the 
international system as a whole. On a systemic and domestic level, developing countries 
created favourable outcomes in an environment dominated by neoliberal-minded 
developed countries. Despite having little other alterative than signing the Agreement, 
developing countries coordinated their interests to the relative benefit of their domestic 
conditions and therefore furthering the collaborative purposes of the regime. 
Understandably, developing countries did not want to be left out of an agreement that 
could alter the development patterns and allow them to participate in the information 
economy through affordable telecommunications access. Therefore the negotiations that 
took place along with the consequent agreement should be placed in the power dynamic 
framework this study has utilised. The developments that took place in the GATT 
Uruguay Round were a dense network of discussions that cannot be covered in this 
analysis. Instead the above description of strategies used merely sought to highlight the 
important role developing countries have played in assuring preferential conditions for 
their domestic telecommunications liberalisation process. By doing so, proponents of the 











liberal institutionalist tradition would note that favourable outcomes have resulted out the 
regime's tendency to promote the common good. Realists would note that states were 
acting in their own interests and were concerned about their relative gains as opposed to 
international collaboration. 
Both approaches have a point, but as mentioned in chapter two, the focus of the 
international relations discipline in this study is located in a neo-realist regime context. 
Therefore, the following section takes into account that states are primarily influenced by 
a hegemon and are self-interested in relative gains for themselves. For both developed 
and developing countries, the negotiations served their individual interests as being an 
attractive destination for investment (developing countries) and the entrenchment of the 
neoliberal system (developed countries). As Singh notes "the negotiations not only 
involved multiple issues but also a variety of actors which would allow developing 
countries to define attractive alternatives. The first type involved other international 
organisations [UNCTAD, ITU, World Bank]. Second, telecommunications operators, 
large users and, to some extent, equipment manufacturers, were involved in direct 
lobbying either through their home governments or directly in Geneva." Acknowledging 
these groups is impOliant, especially since this study's context is largely located in a neo-
liberal era with open capitalist markets and the resources multinational corporations have 
in influencing domestic policies. For developing countries, the benefits accrued by their 
negotiation strategies have to be compared against their obligation to adopt neoliberal 
principles and allow foreign firms to assist develop its telecommunications industry. 
Demonstrating the benefits and costs of the above scenario is South Africa and its 
domestic liberalisation schedule enforced by the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
The above discussion is tabulated in Table 4 as a means of highlighting the costs and 
benefits of developing country accession to the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. It highlights the key points that signatories to the Agreement have 
to take into consideration as they reform their telecommunications industry to allow 











Table 4. - Illustrating the benefits and costs of developing country accession to the WTO 
A B . T,l 19reement on aSlC e ecommumcatlOns 
BENEFITS COSTS 
SYSTEMIC - Cooperation in the - Subject to neoliberal 
international system market system 
- Inclusion in the - Dependence on 
emerging GIP developed countries 
regIme for services and 
- Paliicipation in skills 
global rule 
formation 
- Signs of developing 
world solidarity 
DOMESTIC - Commitments can - Incumbent still has 
be sequenced into monopoly on 
the sector serVIces 
- Provision to roll-out - Generality of 
infrastructure Agreement allows 
through exclusivity political interference 
periods - Lack of compliance 
- Inflow of foreign can lead to further 
investment marginalisation of 
the poor from the 
information 
economy 
Source: Ranchod, Y. (2008) 
South Africa's commitment to domestic liberalisation as a result of slgmng the 
Agreement demonstrates that compliance is not necessarily ensured. A detailed 
description is provided in chapter four; however certain points require mentioning in this 
discussion. Recognising that a substantial amount of foreign capital investment was 
available once the Agreement was signed, South Africa committed itself to liberalising its 
telecommunications sector in a sequenced fashion. The partial privatisation of its 
incumbent brought in capital and skills but in the process displayed the flaws of the 
Reference Paper. South Africa's incumbent operator, with assistance of its business 
partners and the government, capitalised on the lack of specificity and prolonged its 
exclusivity period. What can be concluded from the above discussion is that the South 
African case highlights the centrality of state self-interest in the emerging GIP regime. 











South Africa's social objectives could be addressed through managed liberalisation. 
Although preferential terms were acquired for South Africa's liberalisation process, the 
resulting events over the last decade can be attributed to poor internal compliance which 
is discussed in detail in chapter four. 
The important point made through the discussion on the benefits of accession to the 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications is that states are afforded the opportunity to 
benefit from the signing the central agreement of the emerging GIP regime. Although 
weaker states were compelled to sign by international pressures such as a dependence on 
the neoliberal political economy and the regime's hegemon, potential benefits do exist 
since developing countries provided valued input in the negotiations leading up to the 
agreement and have the chance to develop their electronic commerce capabilities in the 
neoliberal environment. Although developing countries are committed to develop neo-
liberal policies through the direction of the WTO vis-a-vis the US, regime theory allows 
for international coordination to take place in the international system. This sets a 
minimum floor of agreed-upon standards that states have to follow to avoid disputes with 
the WTO. In telecommunications, domestic liberalisation is difficult to achieve given 
opposing factions of the implementation debate. With domestic monopolies, government 
agencies and enriched individuals opposing liberalisation because of the introduction of 
competition and multinationals and international organisations favouring it, the 
implementation of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications in developing 
countries requires careful consideration. Through the above debate, this study has 
concluded that in terms of regime theory, all states have the inclination to coordinate on 
an international level. However compliance is not necessarily ensured as areas of the 
Agreement allow for private interests to obstruct a planned liberalisation process and 
therefore stunt growth in the domestic telecommunication industries. The specific areas 












3.2.1 - Commitments of contention 
Thus far, the attempt at the international level to arrange an agreement that satisfied both 
developed and developing countries had been relatively successful. However, a look at 
the specific commitments in the Reference Paper highlights the disparity between 
international agreements and domestic implementation. The first issue regards setting up 
an independent regulatory authority. With a goal of achieving impartiality between the 
regulator and market participants, the independent regulator is a crucial aspect of the 
commitments found in the Reference Paper. The task of a regulator can best be described 
by looking at South Africa's regulatory authority, ICASA. Its tasks include 123 : 
• Making regulations and policies that govern broadcasting and 
telecommunications; 
• Issuing licenses to providers of telecommunication services and broadcasters; 
• Monitoring the environment and enforce compliance with rules, regulations and 
policies; 
• Hearing and decide on disputes and complaints brought by industry or members 
of the public against licensees; 
• Plan, control and manage the frequency spectrum; and 
• Protecting consumers from unfair business practices, poor quality services and 
hannful or inferior products. 
Fulfilling these tasks is equally important as the independence from government needed 
by the regulator. "It is widely accepted that independent regulation is an essential 
ingredient of structural reform in a country's telecom sector and that its presence or 
absence will directly affect the quality and speed of that refonn. It is, inter alia, crucial to 
raising investment capital and to ensuring efficient and responsive service delivery, 
whether in a competitive or exclusive supply market. ,,124 The consequences of 
123 http://www.icasa.org.zalContent.aspx?Page=17 (accessed 24 October, 2007) 
124 Cohen, T. (2003) "Rethinking (Reluctant) Capture: South African Telecommunications and the Impact 











interference and the reversal of decisions made by the regulator is a critical blow to its 
credibility as an authoritative institution. 
As Henderson et al. (2005) notes, there are two dimensions to regulating the 
telecommunications sector. The first is to have separation of the regulatory function from 
the operating function and secondly to have separation of the regulatory function from 
policy function. 125 Despite being a straightforward task within the sector, both 
dimensions take into account international and domestic factors as independent regulators 
have faced political intervention in developing countries. In the first dimension, problems 
surrounding the making of technical standards as well funding of the regulator has caused 
tension in many developing countries. In both cases, the involvement of the monopolistic 
incumbent has blocked the implementation of international standards and efficient 
regulation of the sector. The second dimension has often been obstructed by political 
intervention. "This is because political influences often occur at the individual (person or 
company) level whether through favouritism or animosity. Political influences therefore 
directly impact upon the ability of a country to comply with the impartiality aspect of the 
principle of separation of policy and regulatory functions contained in the Reference 
Paper.,,126 A combination of inefficient resources and delays in decision making 
procedures makes the Reference Paper a tough set of commitments to follow given the 
resource problems and lack of expertise developing countries face. 
The second issue of contention regards competitive safeguards against telephone network 
providers exploiting their market position. Baer (cited in Dutton, 1996) highlights that the 
failure to introduce fair competition would result in a loss of benefits such as 127: 
• Lower prices to telecommunications users; 
• More variety of, and faster innovation in, service offerings; 
• Greater usage of telecommunications services; 
• More investment in the telecommunications sector; 
125 Henderson, Gentle, Ball (2005) pp. 210 
126 Ibid. pp. 211 











• Productivity gains by telecommunications users, leading to increases in growth 
and output in other sectors; and 
• Increased overall GOP growth arising from positive externalities associated with 
telecommunications networks. 
Taking these points into consideration, it is vital that the actions of major suppliers 128 of 
telecommunication services are not harmful to the sector. The Reference Paper states that 
"appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices.,,129 These practices include cross-subsidization, improper use of information 
obtained from competitors and withholding technical and commercially relevant 
information about essential services. The conflict that stems from non-compliance with 
this commitment relates to government ownership of the incumbent which compromises 
the liberalisation commitments of the Reference Paper as government would have 
national objectives to support its 'own' telecom operator as its main interest. Therefore, 
the introduction of competitive policies by government does not necessarily proceed 
swiftly due to their shareholding interests. The stagnant introduction of competition is 
due to the fact that government derives huge dividends, through phone revenues, by 
controlling its own monopoly operator. This situation places developing countries in a 
tangle as they desperately seek foreign investment in an environment where governments 
are not keen to relinquish their hold to the commitments in the Reference Paper. 
The third commitment, and possibly the most important, is the interconnection 
requirements. As discussed earlier, interconnection enables new entrants access to the 
network of the monopoly provider. If cost for this process is kept high, the chance of 
competition is slim as new entrants would not be able to compete with the monopoly. 
128 According to Cohen (2001: 738) a 'major supplier' is one defined as one that can materially affect the 
terms of participation (price and supply) in the relevant market for basic telecoms services as a result of its 
position or its control over 'essential facilities'. 











Some of the provisions made in the Reference Paper for interconnection with the major 
supplier ensure that it is provided!30: 
• At any technically feasible network point; 
• Under non-discriminatory tenus, conditions and rates of a quality no less 
favourable than provided for its own like services, those of non-affiliated 
suppliers or subsidiaries or other affiliates; and 
• Sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for network components 
it does not need. 
Interconnection essentially allows smaller operators to compete with monopolies and 
large operators. "Further, regulation of interconnection is fundamental where major 
suppliers exist, being suppliers with market power which have no incentive to open their 
networks may levy monopoly rents when providing access.,,!3! Problems such as these 
have been apparent in the South African case and will be explored in the next chapter. 
The final commitment that this study looks at is the provision of universal servicel32 and 
infrastructure investment. As a goal that many developing countries have as well as being 
established in the Reference Paper, the provision of universal service is a complicated 
process given the vast degrees of under-development across countries. The provision 
often has mixed results because of exclusivities granted to the incumbent. The 
unfavourable results have become apparent in South Africa whose goal to address the 
inequalities of the apartheid era were stated early on, but have not materialised over the 
last decade. A number of internal factors have obstructed the roll-out and affordability of 
telecommunications in South Africa. While the Reference Paper is adamant on improving 
130 Tuthill, L. (October, 2003) Telecom Regulations and GATS Rules, Regional Seminar on Telecom and 
Trade Issues, (ITU-ESCAP-WTO, Bangkok). Available at www.unescap.org/tid/mtg/ituwtoesc s4 wto.pdf 
(accessed 3 January, 2008) 
131 Ibid. pg. 214 
132 The ITU defines universal service as: "policies focused on providing individual household connections 
to public telecommunication network." And universal access as: "policies focused on ensuring that all 
people have reasonable means to access a publicly available telephone in their community (but not 
necessarily in their home) through shared use of lines or terminals including public payphones, community 
telecentres, teleboutiques or community Internet access centres." Available on http://www.itu.intiITU-












accessibility, part of the blame is located at the intentions of the Ministry to grant Telkom 
an exclusivity period without the adequate regulatory mechanism to marshal the roll-out. 
Another part includes the Reference Paper's vague language used to articulate this 
principle and how to determine who should be a universal service provider which could 
lead to signatories designing measures to protect local finns!33. But in this vagueness, 
signatories are granted the flexibility to fashion their policies on their unique 
circumstance. 
These commitments are central to understanding how the Agreement on 
Telecommunications would go about liberalising domestic industries. The vague nature 
of some commitments indicates the wide spectrum of countries that have signed the 
agreement. "Although GATS Members have committed to a common V1SlOn on 
liberalization in signing the Protocol, it is evident that within the divergent country 
membership, non-economic policy objectives, often appearing contrary to the GATS 
ideals, will be pursued. These cannot always be quantified in empirically measurable 
ways, and will mean different things to different countries at different times.,,]34 Taking 
into account these divergent interests, the guidelines of the Reference Paper suited the 
interests of developing countries sufficiently for them to subscribe to the electronic 
commerce approach of the emerging GIP regime. 
This chapter discussed the WTO Agreement on two levels - systemic and domestic. On 
both levels there were conditions such as potential investment and sequenced 
liberalisation that suited domestic countries. However, the commitments also meant that 
developing countries would be subject to the neoliberal system of reduced government 
intervention for social development projects (see Table 4). Through the cooperation of 
state and non-state actors on a certain issue, the WTO Agreement has become an 
enforcement mechanism of the regime. Although countries - such as South Africa - were 
compelled to join or risk suffering exclusion from the infonnation economy, their 
interests were sufficiently satisfied and therefore contributed to maintenance of the 












emerging GIP regime. The following chapter will now build on the analysis provided 
above. With a historical overview of the South African telecommunications industry at 
first, the next chapter will progress into a study of South Africa's response to the 
emerging GIP regime with a specific focus on the WTO General Agreement on 











THE TELEcommuniCATion REFORm 
E:-:PERIEnCE: A CASE-STUD~ OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
Before an analysis of telecommunications restructuring in South Africa can take place, it 
is necessary to briefly locate this case-study in the theoretical scheme of this dissertation. 
Thus far, a determined effort has been made to understand the position of developing 
countries in the emerging GIP regime. To do so, a detailed analysis of regime theory and 
the telecommunication regimes was required. This was necessary because there is a need 
to explore in which direction the emerging GIP regime is heading. Having established 
that an electronic commerce had trumped a welfare motivation for the regime, it became 
clear that the current neoliberal environment has shaped the norms, rules and principles 
of the emerging GIP regime. Within this context, it is important to remember that 
developing countries did not gain a significant amount of leverage due to the influence 
developed countries have in the central organisation of the regime - the WTO. However, 
unlike past circumstances, developing countries, with the aid of non-state organisations, 
were not sidelined in the negotiations leading up to the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. As a result, developing countries could determine their level of 
liberalisation in their respective telecom industries but subsequently became dependent 
on the neoliberal system for participation in the information economy. The conflict that 
resulted involved balancing domestic socio-economic concerns whilst observing their 
obligations to liberalise their industries as required in the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. At this stage, it becomes important to introduce South Africa into 
the debate to justify the claims made throughout the study. As a developing country with 
ambitious ideals in its telecommunications policy, South Africa has had to deal with 
hurdles such as a profit-seeking monopoly that controls the infrastructure, problems with 











process. The challenges South Africa's telecommunications sector faces are a significant 
part of its response to the emerging GIP regime. 
This chapter takes this context into account as it provides an in-depth analysis of South 
Africa's telecommunications restructuring process through the lens of its commitments to 
the rules, nonns and principles of the emerging GIP regime. The chapter has been divided 
into four sections. The first section provides a brief history of South Africa's 
telecommunications industry on a domestic and international level. It takes into account 
the socio-economic disparities caused by Apartheid and describes the transition of the 
telecommunications industry in the 1990s. The second section discusses South Africa's 
response to the emerging global information policy regime. A number of factors are 
involved as the analysis looks into the general liberalising trends of the global neoliberal 
environment and South Africa's subsequent response to competitive practices negotiated 
at the WTO. South Africa's role in the epistemic communities that have formed in the 
emerging GIP regime is explored to highlight its position in the developing world vision 
for the infonnation society. Section three looks specifically at South Africa's response to 
the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. The discussion takes issues such as 
anticompetitive practices and the role of the regulator into account as it applies it to South 
Africa's telecommunications restructuring process. This section will also assess whether 
South Africa has made its telecommunications industry accessible to its previously 
disadvantaged citizens or susceptible to privatisation efforts. Section four concludes the 
case-study by evaluating South Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime's 
enforcement mechanism - WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. Explained 
through the theoretical lens of regime theory, South Africa's response highlights the 
important role of international and domestic factors as it creates a telecommunications 
sector that abides by international trade objectives and domestic accessibility concerns. 
4.1 - AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
When looking at South Africa's response to telecommunications reform vis-a-vis the 
emerging GIP regime, it is important to understand the broader socio-political 











were ruled by a white minority that enforced a ruthless system of segregation. This 
racially based system inhumanely subjugated non-white South Africans and distorted 
geographic areas of development within the country. Consequently, large groups of 
citizens within South Africa lacked the necessary infrastructure and skills to enter the 
infonnation economy. As democratic refonn was realised in 1994, the South African 
government had to go about restructuring an imbalanced economy and 
telecommunications industry. Despite the clear socio-economic disparities in its society, 
South Africa has one of the most sophisticated ICT infrastructures in Africa. As early as 
1998, it was noted that: "There are more than 4.2 million telephone mainlines installed 
throughout the country. Over 70 percent of the South African public-switched telephone 
network is digitalized, with over 259,000 kilometers of fiber-optic cable.,,135 
Nevertheless, the South African government could not escape the fact that the 
concentration of resources was in predominantly white areas while many rural areas did 
not even have basic access to telephones. 
The telecommunications authority during apartheid rule operated under similar 
conditions of other countries in the international telecOlmnunications regime. A postal, 
telephone and telegraph (PTT) monopoly ran the state's telecommunication system. 
Specifically, the South African Posts and Telecommunications (SAPT) controlled the 
industry through "legally monopolizing postal and telecommunications services and 
operating a system characterized by internal cross-subsidies.,,136 The first of the three 
nonns of the international telecommunications regime - jointly provided services - was 
apparent in pre-democratic South Africa. At the time, it was regarded as necessary to 
have communications organized as a single, interconnected and integrated network that 
demonstrated economies of scale and scope. 137 The thinking behind 'natural' monopolies 
in the telecommunications sector is not unique to South Africa and was an accepted 
means of providing basic networks universally. However, in the case of South Africa, this 
picture was distorted as the concentration of resources was in line with discriminatory 
I35 Cogburn, D. (1998) "Globalization and state autonomy in the information age: Telecommunications 
sector restructuring in South Africa" in Journal of International Affairs, vol. 51, issue 2, Spring 
136 Horwitz, R. B. (1994) "The Uneasy Relation Between Political and Economic Reform in South Africa: 












apartheid policies. Therefore, unlike other countries that used their monopolies which 
"typically marshaled cost-averaging and value-of-service pricing mechanisms to extend 
serVIce universally, the SAPT historically utilized these practices to extend service 
mainly to whites and to business.,,138 The second nonn of the international 
telecommunications regime - having standardized networks and equipment - once again 
applied to the South African telecommunications sector. Largely facilitated through an 
industrial policy between the SAPT and domestic equipment providers, equipment 
production was done domestically through long tenn contracts with South African 
compames. These contracts set in place local manufacturing capacity that was not 
threatened by international companies. Contributing to the shortage of skills 
contemporary South Africa now faces, was the reservation of jobs in the manufacturing 
sector for whites only. Job reservation was not the only case of government involvement 
as the SAPT was classified as 'state business enterprise' that was run through the office 
of the Minister of Transport and Communications. The ideology behind Ministerial 
intervention - apparent in other PTTs - would have implications that account for the 
current failure in liberalizing the telecommunications industry. As section three of this 
chapter will indicate, the apartheid hangover of state intervention has caused significant 
delays in the liberalizing process. 
The two nonns of the international telecommunications regime mentioned above place 
South Africa in the framework of the consensual international practices of the time. As 
part of an international system that legitimised govermnent involvement in running the 
telecommunications industry, the SAPT could control tariffs and service delivery but 
lacked capital input to rollout further projects. In addition to the monopolistic structure 
that South Africa, like many other countries, established was the apartheid system that 
further distorted the socio-economic conditions for the majority of people as well as 
stifling access for quality service and a competitive environment for businesses. The 
downfall of the SAPT as an apartheid-run organisation ran parallel to the international 
trend of liberalization in telecommunication sectors. A combination of domestic political 
and economic factors meant that South African telecommunications would enter an era of 











proposed reform whereby a celebrated democratic transition would set the tone for 
policies that redressed the inequalities of the monopoly-run industry and the apartheid 
government. Despite the optimistic rhetoric of change, the transition of the 
telecommunications industry would not be as successful as anticipated. 
4.1.1 - South African telecommunications in transition 
Due to the wave of global liberalization and technological innovation as well as 
domestic-related pressures such as the anti-apartheid movement and dealing with a debt-
ridden department in the 1980s and 1990s, the need came to separate the SAPT for the 
improvement of telecommunication access and affordability in South Africa. As has been 
mentioned in previous chapters, the shift toward liberalization did not necessarily reflect 
the end of monopoly operators. In 1991, the telecommunications and postal operations of 
the SAPT were separated, "with the telecommunications functions being vested in 
Telkom, a new 'commercialized' enterprise maintaining a monopoly in the provision of 
fixed telecommunications services.,,139 The highly profitable industry of 
telecommunications meant that the South African government had a vested interest in 
having a majority share in Telkom. This shareholding has been contentious over the last 
decade, leading to irregularities with the regulator and the delayed introduction of a 
second network operator (SNO). As Cohen notes, "Beyond structural modifications 
affecting financial operations and corporate governance, the locus of power and the 
mechanics of monopoly however, remained largely unaltered.,,140 But South Africa was 
determined to redress many of the social inequalities that persisted in its democratic era. 
With high-level leadership encouraging the development of ICT infrastructure and an 
ambitious socially-driven government policy, South Africa detailed its objectives in the 
1996 Telecommunications Act141 . With dedicated objectives that were located in the 
public interest, the Telecommunications Act stressed important policy goals such as 
universal service, consumer protection, competition and innovation, growth and 
investment and the ownership and control of services by historically disadvantaged 
139 Cogbum,D and Adeya, C. A. (September 2001) "Prospects for the Digital Economy in South Africa: 
Technology, Policy, People and Strategies" in WIDER, (United Nations University) pp. 5 
140 Cohen, T. (2003) pg. 66 
141 Telecommunications Act No. 103 ofl996, amended by Act No. 64 of2001 available on 











groups 142. To honour these goals, the government envisioned these development priorities 
in its White Paper on telecom policy. The ideals of the White Paper were put in the 
Telecommunications Act but more significantly changed the way telecommunications 
would be regulated by establishing an independent regulator to achieve the above stated 
goals. This separation of policy formulation, operations and implementation was done 
through the South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SA TRA). 
In 2000, SATRA would merge with the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 
through the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) Act to 
form a new regulator, ICASA. Meanwhile, the government's notion of gradually 
introducing competition into the sector meant that Telkom would be granted an 
exclusivity period to concentrate on the rollout of service and infrastructure to previously 
disadvantaged areas until 2002. 143 While being granted exclusivity, Telkom was partially 
privatized in 1997 as part of the reform process. "The government sold a 30 per cent 
stake in Telkom in March 1997 to a 'strategic equity partner', Thintana Communications, 
formed by the US company SBC and Telekom Malaysia. The details of the shareholder 
contract remain confidential, however SBC appeared to assume a significant degree of 
control over much of strategic and operational decision-making, effectively meaning 
Telkom is driven by private-sector imperatives.,,144 Critics such as Horwitz (2007) and 
Makhaya and Roberts (2003) attribute a significant part of the troublesome liberalization 
process at the feet of government's interference with the regulator. Criticisms such as 
these will be dealt with in further sections. 
The tendency toward widespread social reform witnessed m South African 
telecommunications quickly faded by 2001. As Cohen (2003) notes, "A new 
'development speak' removed from the lofty goals of the initial Reconstruction and 
Development Program, now sees articulation in the "maximization of state assets", as 
142 Cohen, (200 I) pp. 731 
143 Telkom was awarded exclusivity in fixed-line voice telephony for 5 years (to 7 May 2002) with a range 
of conditions that included the rollout of 2.6 million lines in total of which 1.6 million would be set aside 
for under-serviced areas. 











part of a broader plan to restructure state-owned enterprises.,,145 With a shift in focus 
toward improving revenue for the state, the government added legislative innovations that 
secured their stake in all major licenses. An example includes the SNO that was licensed 
in 2006 (three years after the agreed-upon date). As a direct competitor to Telkom, the 
SNO would contain a 30% stake that belonged to Esi-Tel and Transtel, the 
communications division of the state-controlled electricity and transport utilities 
respectively.146 The idea behind employing other sources of telecommunications service 
involved the need to seek alternatives to Telkom's predatory actions. The introduction of 
the Neotel (the SNO) has recently occurred with its composition made up of 
Empowerment Enterprise Nexus Connection (19%), Eskom and Transnet (30%). The 
remaining 51 % is held by a number of domestic and foreign private sector companies147. 
Constrained by high tariffs and Ministerial intervention, the business and public sector 
have undoubtedly been harmed by the exclusivity period granted to Telkom as a result of 
South Africa's commitments in the Reference Paper to liberalize and privatize its telecom 
sector. The ambivalent nature of government rhetoric about universal access and 
Ministerial intervention against the regulator leaves the telecommunications sector in an 
unsettling state. Numerous reports note that while access to telephones has improved 
since 1994, the rising rate of connectivity can almost solely be attributed to the boom in 
mobile communications meaning that Telkom's exclusivity period ultimately failed. 
Figure 3 is a useful representation of this failure as the seven year period from 1997 to 
2004 yielded little progress in the fixed-line users. In contrast, mobile subscribers 
increased dramatically over the same period. A primary reason for Telkom's poor 
performance is the high tariffs it charged which left subscribers with no alternative than 
to disconnect their lines. The portability, relatively low cost and pre-paid structure of 
mobile phones enabled a far wider spectrum of users to have access to ICT. 
145 Cohen (2003) pg. 68 
146 Ibid. pg. 69 











Figure 3: Total Telephone Density 
Total telephone density in South Africa 1997 - 2004 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 20:12 2003 2004 
Source: Gillwald, A. and Esselaar, S. (December, 2004) "South African 2004 ICT Sector 
Performance Review" in LINK Centre Public Policy Research Paper, no. 7 (WITS 
University: LINK Centre) pg. 17 
The rate of disconnections on land-lines far outnumbering that of connections in under-
serviced areas was a direct consequence of high tariffs imposed by Telkom which was 
protected by the Ministry and profit-seeking motives of the private firms that made up the 
incumbent. "The South Africa experience shows that the incumbent will tend to have the 
Ministry's ear, and ~ perhaps because ~ the Ministry is keenly attentive to the company's 
share price in the event of future public offerings.,,148 The consequence of such actions 
cannot be taken lightly as this study earlier argued that telecommunications is a crucial 
tool for South Africa to successfully compete in the international economy. This brief 
overview focused on certain aspects of the telecommunications sector, while the 
following summary adopted from Barendse (2004) provides the highlights of the period 
1993 ~ 2007. Reform of the South African telecom market was characterized by: 
• Phased opening up of the market in distinct stages (1993~2007); 
• Partial privatization (1997, 2002); and 
• Re-design of the regulatory authorities (1996, 2000). 
148 Horwitz R. B. and Currie, W. (2007) "Another instance where privatization trumped liberalization: The 
politics of telecommunications reform in South Africa - A ten-year retrospective" in Telecommunications 











As part of a program of massive legislative refonn, numerous telecom initiatives were 
enacted (Telecommunications Act of 1996, Competition Act of 1998, Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa Act of 2000 and Amendment to the 
Telecommunications Act of 2001), various authorities were created (Convergence 
Regulator, Competition Commission, Universal Service Agency and Arbitration Board) 
and various projects/funds initiated (Public Infonnation Tenninals, Multi-Purpose 
Community Centres, Universal Service Fund, etc. ).149 Despite the delayed introduction of 
the SNO and Ministerial intervention, South Africa has grudgingly aligned its policies 
with the liberalization precedent set In the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
The brief history above was meant to provide a look at the transitionary period that South 
Africa has engaged in since 1992. With a particular look at the relationship between the 
government and the incumbent, the brief outline was necessary to understand the dual 
nature of the problem that faces South Africa. As the problem statement notes in chapter 
one, South Africa has had to balance its welfare ambitions through establishing 
government projects with the liberalisation imperatives of the emerging GIP regime. 
Understanding the above transition is crucial in relating the agreements signed at the 
WTO to how telecommunication policy was fonned in South Africa. Understanding the 
correlation between the Fourth Protocol and South Africa's telecommunication history is 
made easier by the looking at South Africa's commitments to the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
4.1.2 - South Africa's commitments under GATS 
As a signatory on the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, South Africa signaled its 
intentions early on to include itself in the emerging GIP regime. The liberalizing trend in 
other developed and developing countries was clear as the 69 signatories on the 
Agreement, including South Africa, accepted the inevitable shift away from domestic 
monopolies and toward increased competition. However, as South Africa has 
149 Barendse, A. (2004) "Innovative Regulatory and Policy Initiatives at Increasing leT connectivity in 











demonstrated, the shift was not always fruitful for mass consumers, but rather for finns 
involved in the privatization process. Under the GATS though, South Africa committed 
itself to the following pro-competitive and non-competitive changes (See Appendix B for 
the full list). Its cOlmnitments to the Fourth Protocol and Regulatory Reference Paper 
require that: 
• Service sectors are opened which include facilities based and Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PTSN), mobile and satellite services; 
• No bypassing of South African facilities for routing both domestic and 
international traffic; 
• Telkom monopoly on all facilities and voice services until 31\12\2003; 
• Resale to be liberalized between 2002 - 2003; 
• Cellular service duopoly until 2000, after which a third mobile operator would be 
licensed; and 
• Full adoption of the Regulatory Reference Paper which emphasizes the key 
criteria of low interconnection costs, competitive safeguards and universal 
servIce. 
An in-depth discussion on South Africa's GATS commitments will occupy section three 
of this chapter as the complexities are worth discussing in detail. More importantly, the 
need to assess how South Africa has responded to the general requirements of the 
emerging GIP regime's e-commerce approach is necessary for an overall view of its 
international commitments. 
4.2 - SOUTH AFRICA'S RESPONSE TO THE EMERGING GIP REGIME 
As it has been mentioned through the course of this study, the neoliberal environment 
that the infonnation economy has operated within has set the boundaries and regulations 
for the way telecommunications is handled in domestic markets. With private sector 
imperatives guiding the way in most sections of the South Africa economy, the 
telecommunications sector strikes an interesting paradox between the honouring 
international trade objectives of electronic commerce and the need for domestic 











policies with the requirements of the global electronic COlmnerce economy. This can be 
demonstrated by looking at the norms of the emerging GIP regime outlined in chapter 
two. By applying these to the current state of South Africa's telecommunications 
restructuring process, this study will assess whether the emerging GIP regime has had 
any effect on policy fonnulation. 
4.2.1 - How South Africa has adopted the norms ofthe emerging GIP regime 
According to Cogburn (2003), South Africa has adjusted its domestic policy to align 
itself with the electronic commerce economy. A full list of the norms adopted is not 
necessary due to the specific focus of this study but a few are worth highlighting. Length 
constraints do not allow an in-depth discussion of the various facets of change, but key 
norms such as telecommunications infrastructure, universal service/access, intellectual 
property rights, electronic payment systems and domain names are explored. These 
nonns are central to the electronic commerce approach as they incorporate the explicit 
use of ICT to attract foreign investment and safeguard important sectors of the economy. 
Probably the most important norm for the progress of telecommunications is the state of 
its inFastructure. As this study has noted, infrastructural inequality is a serious problem 
in South Africa but initiatives have been made to address accessibility issues. These 
initiatives, regarding universal access and affordable ICT, rest on a market structure that 
promotes a modem network that supports the needs of electronic commerce. For ICT to 
fulfil the promise that the South African Department of Communication envisions, there 
needs to be a pro-competitive environment for telecommunications. Facilitating this need 
is the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunication that South Africa signed as an 
indication of their commitment to liberalising the sector. Despite the numerous 
challenges m achieving an efficient infrastructure system that this study is yet to 
document, South Africa has made the effort to fulfil its mission by enhancing "The well-
being of the people of South Africa, the African continent and the world, through the 
creation of a sustainable and enabling Information Communication Technology 
environment.,,150 Achieving this aim is part of government's ambitions and evident in the 










latest infrastructural developments noted by the Deputy-Minister of Communications: 
"The Department of Public Enterprises is presently engaged in the construction of a fibre-
optic backbone to be used for accessing affordable broadband. The Sentech Wireless 
Broadband infrastructure is to be expanded in pursuance of the same objective. In order 
to ensure affordable access to international ICT infrastructure, the country is investing in 
the NEPAD initiated East African Submarine Cable System (EASSy).,,151 
The second nonn rests on the availability of a capable infrastructure. Universal access 
provides the opportunity for all sectors of society to participate in electronic commerce 
and enter the infonnation economy. Stated as an objective in the White Paper on 
telecommunications, providing universal access has been attempted through various 
initiatives. These initiatives include multi-purpose community centres, telecentres and 
cyberlabs, public infonnation tenninals and libraries. 152 Despite having these initiatives 
run under another innovative organisation known as the Universal Service and Access 
Agency of South Africa (USAASA)153, ICT penetration rates have not fared well in rural 
areas. This disparity is seen between provinces that have a high level of urbanisation and 
therefore a higher concentration of ICT infrastructure as displayed in Figure 4. As an 
illustration of this disparity, Figure 4 highlights the effect of decades of under-
development caused by the apartheid government. The consequences of such 
marginalisation means that "areas with poor ICT availability are likely to be considered 
less favourable for economic investment, thereby limiting enterprise development, job 
creation and restricting the growth of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), 
which are currently seen as a key driver of economic growth.,,154 As a nonn of the 
emerging GIP regime, universal service occupies an important part of South Africa's 
detennination to provide ICT access to its citizens. The progress made however, indicates 
151 Radakrishna L. Roy, Keynote Address at the BMI-T Digital Cities Forum 2006. pg.5, speech available at 
http://www.doc.gov.za/images/stories/Speeches/forum digital cities oct06.pdf (accessed 14 December, 
2007) 
152 Tlabela, K., Roodt, J., Paterson, A. and Wier-Smith G. (2007) Mapping ICT access in South A/rica, 
(Cape Town: HSRC Press) pg. iii 
153 The Department of Communications Annual Report 2006/2007 notes that USAASA facilitates and 
offers guidance on the evaluation, monitoring and implementation of schemes which propose to improve 
universal access and service. In addition, it is involved in setting up telecentres, which provide ICT 
services, especially in rural areas, on a cost recovery basis. 
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South Africa were provided for. Additionally, objectives of the Act included the 
development of national e-strategy, to prevent abuse of information systems and 
encourage the use of e-government systems l56 . These objectives signify that the emerging 
GIP regime's nonns were not taken lightly by the Department of Communications as the 
need to attract foreign investment into the sector was important for South Africa to ensure 
participation in an electronic commerce global society. It is therefore fair to conclude that 
the Department was successful in its task of attracting investment and creating an 
effective electronic payment system, relative to other developing countries. 
The fourth nonn concerns intellectual property rights. Regarded as a global problem in 
areas such as weapon and electronic manufacturing, the protection of intellectual property 
rights has been made more difficult by the scope and interchangeable nature of ICT. 
South Africa recognises this danger as it attempts to engage in the emerging GIP regime 
as a competitive partner. Therefore "South Africa has already made an attempt to comply 
with the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) 
by amending its Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act (Act 38 of 1997).,,157 Other 
sections of the government such as the Department of Trade and Industry have also taken 
a consultative stance with the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WI PO) regarding 
its treaties that would negotiate how countries participate and benefit from electronic 
commerce. As a critical aspect of the way countries will utilise ICT, this nonn highlights 
the need for international consultative bodies that define the way state and non-state 
actors engage with one another to achieve mutually-beneficial outcomes. The final nonn 
concerns domain names which have become a concern in the electronic commerce 
environment. Recognising that trademarks are an important commercial asset within the 
infonnation economy, South Africa has ensured that it protects famous trademarks while 
avoiding the abuse of smaller enterprises. The establishment of the .za Domain Name 
Authority (.zaDNA) was set up to provide SMME's with the chance to utilise the internet 
as a business outlet and a marketing tool158 as well as prevent domain names from being 
156 Maphatane, M., (2006) The leT Research Bulletin, South African Department of Communications, 
December. pg. 21 
157 Cogburn (2003) pg. 148 











"hijacked" by international companies. By protecting and regulating the domain names of 
South African companies, this govermnent initiative is an indication of the commitment 
to electronic commerce agenda of the emerging GIP regime. 
The above outline of South Africa's response to the nonns of the emerging GIP regime 
highlights (a) the usefulness of regime theory in assessing the way actors' expectations 
converge on certain issues and (b) that South Africa has realised that it cannot compete 
for investment if it does not adopt the electronic commerce approach to its 
telecommunications industry. In the scheme of this study, these critical nonns advance 
the importance and centrality of regime theory in policy formation in countries that are 
part of the regime. Subsequently, recent decisions by South African telecom authorities 
such as the privatization of the incumbent and drafting of the Electronic Communications 
Transactions Act in 2002 indicate that South Africa has adopted the required principles 
and nonns to engage in the infonnation economy. Although dominated by an electronic 
commerce approach, South Africa has challenged the emerging GIP regime by including 
socio-economic concerns such as universal service and an exclusivity period granted to 
the incumbent to roll-out telecommunications infrastructure to under-serviced areas. 
The need to address both welfare initiatives and electronic commerce requirements rests 
on the fact that South Africa is still a developing country. This means that the nonns of 
the emerging GIP regime mentioned above are important requirements that South Africa 
should adopt if it is to enter the global infonnation economy. But as can be seen, these 
nonns do not always stress the importance of social welfare initiatives that the emerging 
GIP regime also should be focussing on. Partly due to the dominance of the electronic 
commerce approach, the nonns were the product of developed country interests. "The 
developed country governments decided that the tough issues of international rules and 
standards for electronic commerce should not be hammered out in large, inclusive 
intergovernmental forums like the United Nations, where developing countries could 
exercise their leverage, but in a body like the OECD, which was dominated by wealthy 
states and also had a high degree of technical expertise and organizational capacity.,,]59 In 











an attempt to bridge this disjuncture between developed and developing countries, South 
Africa has taken the momentum of the nonns it has adopted and furthered the importance 
of the infonnation revolution in social development approach of the emerging GIP 
regime. On an international level, it has aligned itself with the development agenda and 
become part of an epistemic community that wants to utilise ICT for the benefit of many. 
4.2.2 - South Africa's place in the epistemic community o[the emerging GIP regime 
Examining South Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime, the focus has thus far 
been on certain policy changes within its legislature since 1992. Having been settled with 
a yawning domestic digital divide, the decisions taken by the government have rested on 
the need to include all sectors of society in the infonnation economy. Although mixed 
results and little refonn over the last decade have dampened the early optimism, South 
Africa has not given up its objectives for a developmental program domestically and on 
an international level. This has been evident by the number of conferences and 
organisations South Africa has been involved in. Most notably, South Africa's 
involvement in the G7 Developing World Infonnation Society and Development (ISAD) 
Conference and the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) affinns its role in the 
epistemic community of the developmental approach to the regime. 
However, South Africa has still found itself on the periphery of decision-making 
structures in the emerging GIP regime. Like many other developing countries, the ability 
of South Africa to influence the direction of the key decisions has been weak. Cogburn 
(cited in Braman, 2004) attributes the lack of developing country influence to the 
inability of developing countries to marshal sufficiently the knowledge resources required 
to influence the process at five strategic points in the infonnation policy and regime 
fonnation processes 160. The five strategic points that relate to the influence epistemic 
communities can exert in the international conference environment are: 
1. Pre-conference activity; 
2. Activities during the conference; 
3. Rule! agreement fonnulation; 











4. Post-conference activities; and 
5. A presence in key information policy cities, called glocal policy nodes. 
As discussed through the course of this study, the lack of influence is due to the central 
role played by the WTO in the emerging GIP regime. Many authors (such as Wilson, 
2004 and Singh, 2002) note that the WTO has predominantly furthered the interests of 
the developed countries. As a result the electronic commerce approach took priority over 
a broader inclusive approach. The resulting scenario effectively means that while 
developing countries are participating in rule and norm formation in the emerging GIP 
regime, their presence is more symbolic than instrumental. With rule and norm fonnation 
created by an epistemic community that predominantly includes developed countries and 
technical specialists, the interests of developing countries will hardly feature in such a 
functionally specific regime. Participants from developing countries that reap the rewards 
of the electronic commerce will therefore only be a small elite within certain countries. 
Replicating the elite-driven nature of the emerging GIP regime, domestic governments 
often concentrate on the profitability of telecommunications within its structures or 
through certain private sector avenues. As critics of the South African 
telecommunications refonn period have noted, the results of public consultation has had 
little bearing on the Minister's various decisions regarding the lowering of tariffs and not 
condemning anti-competitive behaviour by the incumbent. 
Despite South Africa being part of an epistemic community that has had little influence 
on the electronic approach in the emerging GIP regime, it has pioneered a developmental 
agenda in Africa. The most recent initiative is the NEPAD ICT broadband infrastructure 
network for Eastern and Southern Africa that would lay an undersea cable to transfer 
high-speed data that would be under the control of African states. For these initiatives to 
be successful, domestic policy and regulation need to be clearly aligned with the 
developmental and infrastructural programmes of the host states. Linking Africa to 
affordable ICT has been reiterated by high-level authorities in the South African 
government. In a recent speech by the Minister of Communications, Dr. Ivy Matsepe-











the field of leTs should not close themselves away from prevailing realities; rather they 
should follow events and processes in the other fields of governance and development. It 
is for this reason that I wish to suggest that future leT policy and regulatory forums 
should include other participants in the social and economic fields, including security and 
administration in order to harmonise our respective governance and development 
strategies.,,161 The acknowledgement of outside influences in the policy-making process 
highlights that multiple stakeholders have an important role in the emerging GIP regime. 
By not recognizing the important role of other stakeholders, developing countries will not 
be able to enter the electronic commerce approach or get the developmental programmes 
off the ground. South Africa has become aware of this through its reform period and 
committed itself to a leadership role in leT on the African continent. 
Taking all these factors into consideration, this study contends that South Africa's 
response to the emerging GIP regime has thus far been a balancing act between two 
important programmes. On the one hand, South Africa has aligned itself with the 
developing world in making leT widely available and enabling the welfare capacity of 
leT. On the other hand it has had to comply with the dominant electronic commerce 
approach whose epistemic community has focused the imperatives of the emerging GIP 
regime on making global markets work efficiently and faster through greater 
liberalisation and increased competition. South Africa's position is therefore not 
surprising as it drifts between both developing and developed world ideals. In terms of 
the emerging GIP regime, it has clearly spoken one way and acted another. Having 
followed the norms mentioned above and been a signatory on the WTO Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications, South Africa has complied with some aspects of the 
electronic commerce approach realizing that it needs to gain financially out of leT. 
However, it has also promoted social welfare ideals among developing nations that do not 
correspond with a policy needed to promote electronic commerce. With little support 
amongst developed nations and international institutions for the welfare approach, 
161 Dr. Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, Opening Address to the CRASA Workshop on the Impact a/Convergence on 
ICT Policy and Regulation Indaba Hotel, Johannesburg, 25 June 2007. pp5. Speech available at 
http://www.doc.gov.zalimages/stories/Speeches/minister%5C%27s _speech _ crasa _conference _ 25jun2007.p 











developing countries face an uphill battle if their calls are to be heard in international 
decision-making procedures. At best, developing countries like South Africa should 
clearly state their intentions to comply with the WTO Agreement and build a 
telecommunications sector that is self-sufficient and then address the socio-economic 
problems that lCT can help alleviate. It can be argued that South Africa's complex 
refonn path has tried to do this but has failed. To further understand the response, this 
study must look at South Africa's response to the WTO Agreement to clearly underline 
the problem at hand. 
Given these ideals of an infonnation revolution for the African continent, South Africa 
has not provided the best example in leading the way to affordable and accessible lCTs. 
Building on the overview of South Africa's response to the emerging GlP regime, this 
study now focuses on South Africa's response to the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
4.3 - SOUTH AFRICA'S RESPONSE TO THE AGREEMENT ON BASIC 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
The signing of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications by South Africa 
signaled a dedicated effort to align its domestic policies with international agreements. In 
line with the dominant approach of the emerging GlP regime, South Africa recognised 
the need to build a widespread network of fixed-line and wireless telecommunications so 
that all sectors of society could participate in the infonnation economy. Chapter three 
touched on the central purpose of the Reference Paper, that being ending the role of the 
incumbent in holding up competition in a liberalised environment. The importance of the 
Reference Paper cannot be overstated and therefore occupies a detailed discussion in this 
section. This section specifically explores this scenario in the case of South Africa over 
the last thirteen years with a specific focus on two areas of the Fourth Protocol. 
Competition and independent regulation have become non-negotiable commitments in 











Act, South Africa set about following the international mles with little experience or the 
necessary skills in liberalising its telecommunications market. 
Competition and regulation are not the only commitments of cmcial importance for 
developing countries. The Fourth Protocol also stresses the interconnection of new 
entrants into the telecommunications market, the administration of universal service 
bodies and transparency regarding the licensing process. Collectively, these commitments 
underline the purpose of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications which is to 
develop telecOlmnunications across the globe via the introduction of competition into 
domestic markets. Given the interrelated nature of these commitments, the three above 
mentioned commitments are explored after regulatory bodies and competitive safeguards 
are addressed. This enables a concise discussion that can incorporate the various themes 
of this study while reflecting on the role of international agreements. 
4.3.1 - Dealing with competition in the sector 
Much to the dismay of consumers and specialists of ICT in South Africa, reform of the 
telecommunications market stmcture has failed to address cost and accessibility issues. 
The brief historical overview of the South African telecOlmnunications sector explored 
above dealt with standard procedures toward liberalisation of the sector. However, deeper 
analysis shows that the process of liberalisation was obscured by the privatisation 
process. According to Gillwald (2005) the South African case reflects an international 
problem among developing countries surrounding liberalisation moves. "South Africa, 
like most developing countries, had little local expertise in the area of policy, regulation 
and specifically privatisation, though this was often not adequately acknowledged. It was 
highly dependent on the advice of its international financial and policy advisors who 
proposed the three pronged strategies that underlay the international reform model.,,]62 
These three strategies included having the incumbent partially privati sed, creating a 
sector regulator to implement policy and licensing a third cellular operator to stimulate 
competition. 
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Focussing on the first strategy, this study agrees with the views of many authors that 
partial privatization of the incumbent severely affected the progress of 
telecommunication access in South Africa. Furthennore, the market structure, which was 
designed around a vertically integrated incumbent operator, provided the opportunity for 
the incumbent to exploit its monopolistic position with little repercussion from the 
regulator. The refonn strategy of partial privatisation and the extension of Telkom's 
provision of fixed-line services was originally setup to equip Telkom with "the revenue 
generating-capacity it needed to invest in doubling the size of the fixed-line network". 163 
Despite these intentions, the reality played out differently with a reduction in fixed-line 
subscribers and tariff hikes. It is not difficult to imagine why a partially privatised 
company would wish to capitalise on its monopolistic position in such a lucrative 
industry. As this study has noted, the deep disparities in developing countries increases 
the likelihood of internationally-developed reform mechanisms to go wrong in an 
environment of inefficient regulation. South Africa demonstrates this clearly as the 
political transition in the country and relative inexperience of the policy makers created 
the conditions for profit-seeking companies to take advantage. Makhaya and Roberts 
(2003) explain the actual outcome of the refonn process for the incumbent: "By 
providing very limited access to lines required for the provision of data services and 
instituting high price rises it has stifled competition in the market for value-added 
network services [VANS] and has favoured its own operations.,,164 
But where did it start to go wrong? Horwitz and Currie (2007) attribute the "original sin" 
moment to the alteration of the White Paper as draft legislation went to Parliament in 
1996. "The Telecommunications Act vested in the Minister several of the powers the 
White Paper had reserved for the regulator and eliminated the White Paper's 
painstakingly achieved liberalization timetable in favour of ministerial discretion 
regarding when and if various segments of the sector would be opened to competition.,,165 
The implications of this move effectively caused jurisdictional conflicts between the 
regulator and the Minister, which enabled Telkom to strengthen its position as the 
163 Ibid. pg. 471 
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monopolistic operator. With Telkom preying on the inefficiencies of the regulator and 
guided by its business-minded equity partners, it doubled its exclusivity period and 
blocked potential competition by keeping tariffs and equipment usage costs high. 
Despite complaints brought against Telkom by VANS license holders, anti-competitive 
practices continued in full view of the Ministry and public. These practices in part can be 
attributed to the equity partner's strategy. It was to maximise the value of Thintana's 
investment during Telkom's five year exclusivity period then exit quickly.166 This type of 
thinking is not surprising given the fact that Telkom was obliged to provide a competitive 
environment by 2003 and therefore saw profit maximisation as a priority. "Profit 
maximisation means that there is no incentive to examine the sustainability of services -
the targets will be met in the cheapest way possible with little regard to high rates of 
disconnection, which means a continued bias to urban and peri-urban areas.,,167 The 
consequent effect on the South African telecommunications industry is therefore 
troublesome as universal service ambitions and the roll-out of infrastructure are not the 
main priorities of the incumbent. 
The above scenano IS not umque to the South African case as the moves toward 
liberalisation starts in the electronic commerce approach of the emerging GIP regime. 
Signatories of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications recognised the role of the 
incumbent as being potentially hannful given the vertically integrated structure of the 
monopolistic operators. It was therefore imperative that effective competition in the 
sector be dependent on policies that governed the initial structure of the competitive 
segments of the market, the conditions of entry into the market and conditions 
surrounding access to the monopoly network facilities 168. Implementing these provisions 
have proven to be difficult given the conditions of the five-year monopoly Telkom was 
granted that allowed a monopoly on services and a non-standardised approach to 
exclusivity periods. "Many commentators have criticized the RP provision as 'toothless', 
most notably for the failure to specify a mechanism with which to address such practices, 
166 Ibid. pg. 450 
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leaving members to determine their own, non-standardized measures.,,169 Telkom 
provides the most appropriate case for underlining the inability of the WTO to take action 
against members that have been granted exclusivity periods and therefore blurred the line 
between competitive and exclusive services. 
The focus on promoting privatization m developing countries has been the standard 
driver of refonn during the shift toward liberalisation. Recognised by neoliberal 
international organisations, such as the WTO, as the primary mechanism to promote 
foreign market access, privatization commitments in the Reference Paper leave 
developing countries with little clarity on implementation or guidance. As a result the 
state's intention to maximise the selling of state assets undennines the other processes of 
liberalisation such as competition. "The efficiencies competition is intended to bring into 
the market are therefore not introduced, prices remain high for telecommunication users 
and consumer's choices remain limited. The most significant outcome of this pre-
occupation with privatization in South Africa is that the number of citizens connected to 
the fixed-line network today, at the end of the private monopoly period, has barely 
changed since before the monopoly was privatised in 1997.,,170 Although the Reference 
Paper advises that appropriate measure be taken to prevent major suppliers from 
engaging in or perpetuating anti-competitive practices, the ambiguity of the commitments 
regarding incumbent exclusivity places refonn at the mercy of national development 
policies. 
This study does not conclude that privatisation of the telecommunications sector is 
necessarily a mistake. As many developing countries have to deal with a lack of funds 
and resources, attracting a substantial amount of foreign investment and introducing 
competition is the key to addressing social conditions and balance of payments crisis. 
However, a number of factors have to be considered and carefully administered if the 
liberalisation of a sector is to be beneficial to a country. As Gillwald (2005) notes: 
"Privatisation without the regulatory capacity or political will to manage the behaviour of 
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the incumbent as a private monopoly or subsequently in a more competitive environment, 
can be entirely counter-productive to the achievement of the very goals intended by 
liberalisation, not least of which is affordable access.,,171 For a competitive market to 
function efficiently in any country, it is critical for an independent, non-aligned regulator 
to implement and maintain the market's procedures. The foIIowing section wiII expand 
on how this process went wrong in the South African case. 
4.3.2 - An Incapacitated Regulator 
A condensed version of the regulatory problems in South Africa is provided here as the 
details exceed the constraints of this study. It is also important to relate the regulatory 
issues to the central WTO Agreement that this study is focussing on. Therefore, it must 
be noted that the Reference Paper requires that: "The regulatory body is separate from, 
and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services. The decisions 
of and the procedures used by the regulators shaII be impartial with respect to all market 
participants.,,172 Given the clarity of the regulator's purpose, Cohen (2001) notes that the 
Reference Paper is silent on the need for regulators to be separate from and not 
accountable to government. 173 As this brief discussion will show, this has been to the 
detriment of the telecommunications sector in South Africa due to the joint jurisdictional 
structure. The problem of regulatory independence is not unique to South Africa as this 
commitment is widely acknowledged as central to the liberalisation movement. Since 
many developing countries were part of the negotiations and signatories of the 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications, the Reference Paper had to deal with an 
emerging industry in many countries. Highlighted as a commitment of contention in 
chapter three, the setting up of an independent regulatory body in developing countries, 
such as South Africa, has had problems in the separation of its functions. Both the 
separation of regulatory function from operating functions and policy functions have 
raised compliancy issues between South Africa and the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Article 5 of the Reference Paper cited in Henderson, Gentle, Ball (2005) pg. 210 











To understand the problems with compliance between South Africa and the Reference 
Paper, a brief synopsis of South Africa's regulatory problems is required. Problems 
surrounding the perceived independence of the regulator started as early as 1993 when 
the IBA, while given the power to formulate and implement policy, was funded by 
government and therefore influenced by the interests of the state rather than the market. 
These fears played out over the following years as SA TRA displayed high levels of 
inefficiency and financial mismanagement regarding the licensing of the third cellular 
operator174. 
The role of government occuples a precanous place ill the South African 
telecommunication environment which is highlighted by its actions in the downfall of 
SATRA as the independent regulator. Along with Horwitz and Currie's (2007) "original 
sin" moment noted above, the dual jurisdiction structure hampered the authority SA TRA 
had over regulating Telkom's actions. Having been a major shareholder in Telkom, the 
government muddled its roles in becoming the policy-maker for a liberalised 
telecommunications market while simultaneously protecting its interests in the highly-
profitable incumbent operator. "As a result, policy in the sector has unfolded in fits and 
starts, marked by many controversial incidents and abrupt reversals of strategy, the 
cancellation of ICASA regulations by the Minister, and the delay of competitive entry 
notably in the licensing of a third mobile and a second network operator.,,175 These 
moves by the Ministry to delay competition into the sector illustrate a noteworthy 
problem in the requirements of the Reference Paper. 
As this study has noted, the balancing of domestic social concerns with international 
trade objectives in developing countries is a combination that needs careful attention and 
sequenced implementation. South Africa's attempt at 'managed liberalisation' was an 
ambitious strategy to occupy dual roles for the state on regulatory issues. Given the lack 
of capacity and relative inexperience in the liberalisation process, the Ministry often 
subscribed to protecting its state asset at the cost of promoting the broader interests of 
174 A chronology of the third mobile license events is available on 
www.cellular.co.za/thirdlicensetimeline.htm (accessed 2 October, 2007) 











society. In this environment, it is difficult to imagine the commitments of the Reference 
Paper being carried out without flaws. Following the various breakdowns between 
SATRA and the Ministry, a merger between the two regulators seemed the appropriate 
measure to reintroduce confidence into the regulatory process. 
Following the merger of the IBA and SATRA into ICASA in 2000, the regulatory 
framework set out objectives that included ensuring investment, growth and development 
in the broad public interest. But similarly to SATRA's problems, ICASA has been 
hampered by a lack of resources and capacities to regulate telecommunications with a 
monopolistic incumbent still in place. Once again, Ministerial interference meant that 
ICASA regulations and licenses had to be approved by the Ministry which led to 
bottlenecks and critical sector development regulations being delayed for long periods of 
time. 176 Coupled with Ministerial interference was the source of funding for ICASA. 
Often cited as a serious impediment to effective regulation in the sector, the lack of 
financial resources and financial independence from the Government meant that political 
interference has been unavoidable. Henderson (2005) sums the situation up well by 
noting that inadequate funding inevitably leads to over-reliance on the incumbent's 
resources and inadequate regulation in particular areas of importance. ln With the 
Treasury as the source of funding, policy implementation, and more importantly - the 
reputation of the regulator, was in serious doubt of being free from Government 
influence. 
An analysis of South Africa's regulatory environment cannot ignore the obstructive role 
the Ministry had in promoting a competitive environment in the telecommunications 
sector. However, it is important to recognise that developing countries like South Africa 
have weighed their options in light of the commitments set forth in the Reference Paper. 
While the Reference Paper requires that regulatory bodies should be separate from 
suppliers of basic telecom services, the lack of clarity on schedules as well as the social 
conditions within developing countries necessitates that government's role is not 
independent from the sector. "While almost all countries recognize the need for a 
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separate regulator, the myriad and complex relationships with government and industry 
result in many manifestations of that ideal which cannot simply be measured by structural 
separation alone ... Many country regulators report to sector ministries; some, like SA, 
report to Parliament and others to their Head of State. All tend to reflect, however, that 
while a baseline of separation from government is required, independence cannot be 
absolute.,,178 Cohen's (2003) comments reflect the reality in many developing countries 
as the separation of state and the market has not been possible. Accompanied by the 
presence of the incumbent operator, many developing countries' regulatory failures have 
been due to endogenous barriers to competition such as political intervention and the 
effects of vertical integration. 179 As the description of the market structure pointed out, 
vertical integration leaves little room for the regulator to do its job in making sure that the 
market is functional and fair. 
As the two central commitments of the Reference Paper, both competitive safeguards and 
an independent regulator are crucial points of discussion when analyzing South Africa's 
response to the emerging GIP regime. However, there are two other commitments that 
are of equal importance and interrelate with the above mentioned commitments. The first 
is that of interconnection. As an important requirement to fulfill the WTO mandate, 
interconnection rests on the willingness of the monopoly operator to let new entrants into 
the market. In relation to competition and regulation, interconnection acts as the 
mechanism that enables successful completion of the two. "In order to achieve effective 
competition, interconnection must be assured. Without interconnection, smaller operators 
would have no prospect of competing with larger operators with more extensive network 
and customer coverage. Further, regulation of interconnection is fundamental where 
major suppliers exist, being suppliers with market power which have no incentive to open 
their networks in order to promote competition or having opened their networks may levy 
monopoly rents when providing access.,,180 Recognizing the important relationship 
between these factors enables a better understanding of the South African situation. Much 
of this analysis has commented on the role of the incumbent in holding back competition. 
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This has been done through charging high costs for interconnection thereby keeping 
competitors, who are dependent on Telkom's lines, out of the sector. 
In terms of the interconnection requirements in the Reference Paper, South Africa has 
distanced itself from compliance over the last decade. Telkom, along with government's, 
actions were deemed so obstructive that action was taken against them by the USA's 
AT &T on the grounds of Telkom's anti-competitive behavior. A combination of 
Ministerial intervention and regulatory incompetence rendered South Africa's 
commitments to promoting liberalization an extremely difficult objective. The charges 
brought against Telkom sum up the implications of poor interconnection. "The claim 
suggests that Telkom's refusal to provide facilities is contrary to SA's WTO obligations 
to provide market access and national treatment for VANS. It is further claimed that SA 
is obligated to prevent Telkom from abusing its monopoly position when competing in 
the supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights." 181 Telkom's violation 
may have gone relatively unpunished through out-of-court negotiations, but it had caused 
significant delays in another commitment of the Reference Paper, the provision of 
universal service. 
The pursuit of universal servIce has in some cases run contrary to the liberalization 
imperatives of the WTO. South Africa falls into the category of having non-economic 
policy objectives while pursing the ideals of the Reference Paper. The need to recognise 
divergent circumstances in developed and developing countries is acknowledged by 
GATS. This is evident in GATS allowing Members to regulate services in order to meet 
divergent national policy objectives. Additionally, the Reference Paper allows for 
exclusivity periods for the incumbent on certain conditions of infrastructure rollout. 
Although critics of the Reference Paper regard this move as self-defeating in terms of 
making national policy goals susceptible to the monopoly operator's profit-maximisation 
motives, the provision of universal service cannot have a standard procedure given the 
varying domestic environments. Despite South Africa's telecommunications industry 
being held up by high interconnection costs, the government has instituted a number of 











initiatives at providing universal servIce to citizens that were excluded during the 
apartheid era. These provisions were made early on in the White Paper on 
telecommunications and have been observed under the GATS requirements as well. The 
provision of universal service is an idealistic goal, especially in the environment of the 
monopolistic incumbent, but with government backing and compliance with the 
Reference Paper's requirements of transparency and non-discrimination, the exclusivity 
period can work. 
4.3.3 - Evaluating South Africa's response to the Reference Paper 
The analysis provided above adopted a descriptive approach to South Africa's response 
to the Reference Paper. In an attempt to remain concise, this study has omitted a large 
percentage of the events and negotiations that took place during South Africa's 
transitionary phase. This was necessary so that two positions could emerge in the debate 
on South Africa's response. By putting the different contexts into perspective, the debate 
handled the neoliberal requirements of the WTO and the South African government's 
priorities in assisting previously disadvantaged citizens acquire ICT access. These two 
positions fonn the crux of South Africa's overall response. Much of this study has 
detailed the international implications of the emerging GIP regime on developing 
countries, but specific examples are necessary to highlight how a developing country 
would adapt to an international agreement that is part of the emerging GIP regime. 
One of the criticisms of the Reference Paper mentioned in chapter three noted that the 
level of generality of the Reference Paper allows countries to interpret the competition 
and interconnection principles in a number of ways therefore contributing to further 
protection of the incumbent. Coupled with the weakness of failing to specify regulatory 
independence from government, South Africa's compliance with the liberalization 
refonns were obstructed by private sector and government interests. 
This study doubts that there was a deliberate attempt by South Africa to undennine the 
intentions of the Reference Paper. Instead the issue of non-compliance can be attributed 











factors placed South Africa's reform process in an uneasy predicament. On the one hand, 
South Africa's commitment to the Reference Paper meant that the introduction of 
competition and the establishment of an independent regulator were non-negotiable 
principles for the sector. Opening the sector to foreign investment was an important move 
to relieve the debt-ridden incumbent of its losses. On the other hand South Africa has had 
to deal with the deep social inequalities resulting from the apartheid era. The democratic 
government emphasized the importance of redressing past imbalances through the 
Telecommunications Act which promoted universal service aims that inherently clashed 
with the GATS reforms. South Africa's domestic agenda played into the flaws of the 
Reference Paper and raises interesting questions regarding the benefits of accession to the 
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications for underdeveloped economies. 
Despite the Reference Paper lacking particularity, the weakness of the South African 
telecommunications sector cannot be solely attributed to Reference Paper's flaws. As 
Cohen (2001) notes: "Arguably, less than satisfactory results in SA's case, are 
attributable to weak regulatory design and the implementation, but this is not a burden the 
regulator should bear alone: the legislature needs to loosen the purse strings and clothe 
the regulator with ability to carry out its functions." 182 Another serious impediment to 
accessible and affordable ICT in South Africa was the way the liberalization process was 
conducted over the last fifteen years. Horwitz and Currie's (2007) aptly titled article -
"Another instance where privatization trumped liberalization" - sums up the major fault 
in South Africa's telecommunication reform process. A mixture of political interference, 
profit-maximisation motives of the incumbent and an incapacitated regulator kept the 
goal of universal service a distant reality. But how much of the blame can be attributed to 
the Reference Paper? Many authors have noted that the document is a guideline and 
therefore not a strict checklist of measures that characterised previous neoliberal reform 
documents such as the Washington Consensus. But, according to Cohen (2001), therein 
lies the ability for domestic governments to shape their prerogatives while abiding by the 
principles of the Reference Paper. The flexibility granted to domestic governments 
enables checks and balances to be put in place thereby avoiding full deregulation which 











would not reap any rewards for the state. Achieving its national policy goals is high on 
South Africa's list of objectives and evident in the various legislations that have been 
passed to facilitate the provision of universal access. Concurrently, South Africa has also 
abided by the norms and rules of the electronic commerce approach of the emerging GIP 
regime and in that process managed to obstruct development through not having a 
suitable market structure and regulatory functions. 
When looking at South Africa's response to the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications there are a number of factors that need to be taken into 
consideration. There is little doubt that the refonn process has not yielded optimal results 
but as Gillwald (2005) notes, "The strategies of economic regulation of 
telecommunications sectors have been instituted all over the world to deal with the 
imperfect market conditions that tend to exist in the early stages of market liberalization, 
especially where there is a dominant incumbent.,,183 Taking comfort in that South Africa 
is not alone in the problems it has encountered as well as the fact that the GATS Fourth 
Protocol is still in its infancy stages provides some relief for scholars looking forward to 
an efficient and affordable telecommunications sector. With the requisite safeguards of 
the Reference Paper installed in domestic law and with the convergence of technology 
breaking down the monopoly on services, South Africa's telecommunications 
environment is in the midst of a momentous change. Through the GATS Fourth Protocol, 
the problems of South Africa and other newly-liberalizing sectors are on the decline. 
Formulating a conclusion on this analysis will take up a substantial amount of the 
following chapter. Looking at South Africa's response to the emerging GIP regime 
cannot focus solely on the Reference Paper. Rather a conclusion is required that 
incorporates the discussion that has taken place throughout this study and tying them 
together in a summarized manner. 












sumrnAR~, conCLUSion AnD 
REcommEnDATions 
5.1 - Answering the Research Question 
In summarizing this study, there is an immediate need to address the research question -
"What has South Africa's response been to the emerging global infonnation policy 
regime?" - posed in chapter one. On a domestic level, South Africa can affirm that since 
its democratic transition, it has fonnulated policies that have promoted liberalization in 
the sector. Legislative measures include the Telecommunications Act of 1996, ICASA 
Act of 2000 and the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002. However, 
below the surface, its commitment to liberalize the sector has been plagued by a 
vertically-integrated market structure and regulatory incompetence which has deeply 
affected the development of telecommunications in South Africa. 
These set-backs are not mutually exclusive from its international obligations to the WTO. 
This study has noted that on a systemic level, South Africa was susceptible to the 
international liberalization commitments m the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. As a developing country with an under-developed environment for 
privatization and insufficient political will to block the actions of the monopoly operator, 
South Africa's response is characterised by disjointed efforts to provide social upliftment 
through ICT and make the telecommunications market more competitive. 
At the heart of the response was the need to alter policy fonnulation toward the interests 
of the market and provide universal access/ service. It is difficult to criticize South Africa 
for its focus on providing universal service to many to of its previously disadvantaged 
citizens. Commendable projects such as the Universal Service Fund (USF) and the 
establishment of rural telecentres indicate that South Africa was keen on addressing its 











had an important role to play in the telecOlmnunications sector. Unfortunately, the 
intervention of government went further than structuring universal service programs into 
a dual jurisdiction role with the regulator. As the analysis on South Africa's response 
noted, the main problem in carrying out the liberalization process was the market 
structure and Ministerial intervention regarding the regulators actions. The vertically-
integrated market structure allowed the incumbent to maintain its monopoly by charging 
high interconnection costs therefore blocking the entrance of new market players into the 
sector. Surprisingly, government did not act against these actions and overruled the 
regulator's decisions on occasion. 
To further understand South Africa's response in the context of this study, it is important 
to mention a term that is linked to the overarching entity under which we have looked at 
South Africa's response. The tenn "emerging" is of critical importance when 
understanding the emerging GIP regime. Little mention has been made of the fact that the 
emerging GIP regime is constantly evolving and adapting to the neoliberal political 
environment and rapid pace of technological innovation. Consequently, its rules, nonns, 
principles and decision-making procedures are a product of multiple stakeholders and 
therefore constantly influenced by new developments in areas such as technological 
convergence184. Instead of a hindrance to a set of definitive rules and obligations, the 
emergence of the GIP regime reinforces the claims of globalisation, namely, that policy 
formulation is rapidly adapting to a new set of international factors such as technology. 
5.2 - Summary 
Chapter one clearly set the conceptual and methodological outline of this study. By 
highlighting the two-fold nature of the problem statement - the direction of the emerging 
GIP regime and South Africa's response - it was able to discuss the international and 
domestic implications of the regime. In addition, the utilization of a case-study 
methodology assisted in providing tangible observations about the effects of the 
emerging GIP regime on developing countries. Theoretically, the use of a neo-realist 
184 See Mlitwa, N. (2004) "Implications of Convergence on the Regulatory Regime, e-Commerce, the 
Industry, and the Society at large in South Africa" as a research paper submitted to the Link Centre (Wits 











approach that stressed the centrality of the state to facilitate global cooperation helped 
explain the context in which South Africa participated in the emerging GIP regime. A 
branch of the neo-realist theory - hegemonic stability theory - also provided the 
necessary framework to understand how the regime was fonned and which states and 
epistemic communities control the emerging GIP regime. The framework that was 
provided for this study in chapter one had the central aim of exploring the battle South 
Africa faces as it balances international trade commitments with domestic socio-
economic concerns. 
Chapter two assisted in proving a theoretical framework in which this negotiation would 
take place. By using regime theory to explain international cooperation, South Africa's 
seemingly contradictory shift toward liberalization (considering that it wanted to provide 
centrally-controlled socio-development projects across wide areas of South Africa) was 
explained in the context of a global hegemon (US) that compelled states to be part of the 
electronic commerce approach in the emerging GIP regime. With little other alternative 
than to adopt neoliberal practices, South Africa's shift in macro-economic policy 
demonstrated the global shift in the international political economy toward deregulation 
and open markets. 
Additionally, the neoliberal international political economy is heavily influenced and 
managed by developed countries such as the US. A noticeable shift was made toward: 
"structural and institutional refonn with elements of corporatization, licensing of 
competitive operators, privatization, and establishment of explicit regulatory structures 
and specialized regulatory agencies.,,185 Powerful commercial internet companies such as 
Google, Microsoft and Amazon all originate from the US, therefore contributing to its 
significant financial and organisational capabilities. "The macro-economic rationale is at 
the heart of the decision to privatize in the telecommunication industry. In this context it 
is hard to disentangle the effect of market liberalization that occurred in response to 
technological change and demand growth from the effects ofprivatizations resulting from 
185 Henten, A. (2004) "Telecommunications Development in Africa: Filling the Gap" in Telematics and 











global government restructuring.,,186 This trend was discussed in the descriptive analysis 
of the telecommunications regimes and accounts for the neoliberal policy formulation in 
the emerging GIP regime. The interrelationship is therefore difficult to separate but a 
mechanism to facilitate the privatization movement did develop in WTO structures. 
Chapter three analytically discussed the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications 
as tool to facilitate coordination in the international system. This chapter re-emphasized 
that the US facilitated the dominance of the electronic commerce approach through the 
WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications. This multilateral agreement acts as an 
extension of the US's hegemonic position and the neoliberal political economy. By 
shaping domestic policies toward liberalization, the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications acts as an enforcement mechanism of an international economic 
system that promotes open markets and increased cross-border trading. The commitments 
that signatories had to implement were not clearly achievable as hoped. Due to the lack of 
skills and infrastructure in developing countries such as South Africa, the commitments 
were contentiously implemented and with little guidance from international 
organisations. 
Nevertheless, the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications demonstrated the 
applicability of regime theory as a tool in understanding international coordination. This 
display of international coordination was evident in the systemic and domestic gains 
developing countries would achieve through accession to the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications. Through the debate in chapter three, this study concluded that all 
was not lost for developing countries that accepted neoliberal refonns. Evidence of this is 
seen in the influence developing countries had in negotiating the WTO Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications. Asserting their influence in such an important multilateral 
platfonn highlights that through solidarity, developing countries are able to make a space 
for themselves in the decision-making forums of the emerging GIP regime. A 
186 Bezzina, J. and Sanchez, B. (eds) (November, 2005) "Technological Convergence and Regulation: 
Challenges Facing Developing Countries" in Communications and Strategies: Special WSIS Issue, 











considerable amount of effort is needed if they are to influence the epistemic 
communities that construct the regime. 
With the theoretical and implementation tools analysed, chapter four utilized the South 
African case-study to explain a developing country's response to the emerging GIP 
regIme. For South Africa, the pressing need to enter the infonnation economy IS 
demonstrated by its liberal macro-economic policies. It understands that to be 
competitive in the international system, it must adopt the nonns of the emerging GIP 
regime through adopting the Reference Paper and promoting the liberalization of its 
telecommunications industry. However, the adoption of neoliberal economic policy did 
come at the expense of reduced government involvement in social development projects. 
The ideal of greater efficiency and reduced costs with the implementation of privatisation 
has not been as forthcoming as expected by neoliberal proponents. South Africa 
demonstrates the pitfalls of liberalization but more so the general tendency of developing 
countries to implement policies they are not adequately equipped to deal with. 
In its commitment to both approaches of the emerging GIP regime, South Africa has 
demonstrated the willingness to liberalise its sector as well as provide developmental 
infrastructure for the multi-purpose use of leT. Its response has highlighted the negative 
effects of these commitments as a vertically-integrated market structure and inefficient 
regulation can lead to underdevelopment and non-compliance. However, through 
adopting nonns such as guarding intellectual property rights and domain names, rolling 
out infrastructure and establishing electronic payment systems, South Africa is creating a 
space for itself in the electronic commerce approach and participating in the infonnation 
society. Moves toward improving country-wide access is not as swift though, but South 
Africa is making universal access a priority for its citizens. Despite getting its refonn 
period in a state of disrepair during liberalisation, South Africa has stayed committed to 
its objectives stated in the White Paper on Telecommunications. It also recognises that 
the introduction of the SNO will have to be protected from Telkom's anti-competitive 
practices. This was acknowledged in the 2003 WTO Trade Policy Review minutes: "The 











by the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), the 
telecommunications regulator, as well as by the Competition Commission. The 
Competition Act of 1998 was changed to accommodate concurrent jurisdiction between 
South Africa's regulatory bodies and the Competition Commission.,,187 This is vital if 
South Africa is to align its domestic agenda with the trend of liberalisation in other 
developing countries and promote competition in the sector. Through the descriptive 
analysis of South Africa's response, the following findings were made that address the 
problems of implementing the Reference Paper and being part of the electronic 
commerce approach of the emerging GIP regime. 
5.3 - Findings from the study 
From the evidence stated above, there can be little doubt that the emerging GIP regime 
has adopted the electronic commerce approach. This study contends that the influential 
factor was the role of the hegemon (USA) in determining the direction of the regime. As 
the description of hegemonic-stablity theory noted above, the US was able to influence 
the formation of the regime because of its global political and economic standing. It was 
also able to compel other states and private companies to adopt the principles it saw fit 
for the regime. Authors such as Braman (2004) and Wilson (2004) back this claim by 
noting that the Clinton administration assisted the prominence of the electronic 
commerce approach by pushing privatization in important sectors such as the domain 
name system. 
The analysis in chapter four highlights that while South Africa is ambitious in promoting 
a more development-oriented epistemic community, the reality of shifting the political 
and economic interests of developed countries and transnational corporations will require 
a paradigmatic shift in the emerging GIP regime. The likelihood of this shift is slim and 
therefore necessitates that signatories on the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications adopt the liberal practices of privatization and liberalization 
responsibly so that their twin objectives of increased participation in the information 
187 Minutes from WTO Trade Policy Review for SADC, (2003) available on 
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN highLightParent.asp?gu=%28+%40meta%5FTitle+South+Africa+or+SAC 











economy and providing universal service can be carefully administered. Accompanied by 
independent regulation, the liberalization of their respective telecommunication industries 
holds promise for many developing countries battling to attract investment and address its 
skills shortage. 
Understandably, developing countries have been less than optimistic with privatization of 
their incumbents since it has made little change in cost or accessibility. The problem of 
"cherry picking" is a real concern as incoming investors will choose profitable sectors of 
the industry while neglecting much needed development in rural areas. Checks and 
balances within the regulatory authority coupled with a high degree of independence are 
of critical importance to make sure that fair infrastructural development happens. In 
policy realms, developing countries will need to introduce the information society 
objectives into their wider development strategies as ICT now covers a wide range of 
sectors. Collaboration among Ministries will go a long way to developing a set of agreed-
upon objectives in domestic policy formulation. South Africa is one example of the 
realization that the interests of different sectors need to converge for the development of 
its ICT capabilities. As the case-study demonstrated, the task is long and often painful to 
customers and the government. 
Recent domestic developments indicate that South Africa has overcome the difficulties of 
the liberalization process and is now benefiting from the nonns, rules and principles it 
abided to in the emerging GIP regime. Two pieces of legislation are worth noting as a 
demonstration of South Africa being aligned to both approaches of the regime. The first 
is the Electronic Communications Act, 2005 (ECA) which took effect on 19 July 2006. 
The ECA was a response to the rapid development of technology and the occurrence of 
convergence between telecommunication and broadcasting technologies. As a measure to 
stimulate competition in the sector, the ECA also promotes the empowerment of 
historically disadvantaged people in this sector and to ensure that electronic 
communications services and broadcasting services are provided by and to persons from 
a diverse range of communities. These are admirable qualities that government is trying 











regulation matters m an unconvmcmg state. "The ECA certainly represents a step 
forward for the liberalisation of the electronic communications market. Its 
implementation, however, has imposed significant regulatory burdens on ICASA. 
ICASA's task in giving effect to the ECA is not made any easier by the fact that some of 
the ECA' s provisions have been fonnulated in imperfect ten11S. The result is that the new 
regulatory system will take some time to be established.,,188 South Africa is heading 
toward the electronic commerce approach; however bumps in the road will always be 
persistent. To ease the momentum, the South Africa government has relied upon itself to 
provide the necessary infrastructure for ICT connectivity. 
The second piece of legislation once again delves into the blurry area of government 
involvement in telecommunications. The broadband infrastructure initiative, lnfraco, is a 
government owned enterprise that would drive down the cost of broadband internet in 
South Africa. This government initiative, owned by Eskom and Transnet, involves laying 
down fiber-optic cables that would link South Africa's major cities and run under the sea 
along the West Coast. 189 The piece of legislation involved with this initiative was recently 
approved by Thabo Mbeki and is related to the Electronic Communications CEC) 
Amendment Act of 2007 and the Broadband lnfraco Act of 2007. It is worth mentioning 
the EC Amendment Act of 2007 as it empowers communications minister Ivy Matsepe-
Casaburri to initiate and facilitate strategic government ICT infrastructure investments 
such as Infraco l90. The impact of this empowerment is of concern to analysts as history 
has shown that government involvement in telecommunications has not led to positive 
results. The presence of government and its R627 million investment in lnfraco will make 
market participants nervous; however this legislation highlights the policy of bringing 
down connectivity costs. "The promulgation of both Acts brings SA closer to 
government's goal of lowering telecommunications costs, and increasing productivity and 
188 "The Electronic Communications Act: An Overview", Press and Publications, available on 
http://www.bowman.co.za/LawArticles/Law-Article.asp?id=2132417221 (accessed 2 January 200S) 
189 "State Company Infraco to Cut Telecoms Costs" (13 February 2007) available on 
http://www.ioltechnology.co.zalarticle page.php?iArticleId=3679673&iSectionld=2SS4 (accessed 2 
January 200S) 
190 "Mbeki Signs Infraco Laws" (17 January 200S) available on 
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/telecoms/200S/OSO 1171 036.asp? A=LEG&S=Legal%20View&O=FPLEA 











economic growth, says the Department of Public Enterprises.,,191 South Africa is indeed 
heading into a brighter future in tenns of telecommunications access. The above-
mentioned legislative measures will have to be assessed at a later stage as time will tell 
whether the intervention of government will have a positive effect. 
5.4- Conclusion 
This study concludes that South Africa is part of the international cooperation endeavour 
that is the emerging GIP regime. In line with regime theory, South Africa accustomed its 
domestic policies with the precedent set at the international level. This has been 
demonstrated by the adoption of the WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and 
the Reference Paper. Critics might point out that South Africa's government had altered 
the industry toward an inward looking strategy through an exclusivity period for the 
incumbent, but these actions still fonn part of the emerging GIP regime's liberalization 
principles. "Privatizations initially often come with exclusivity periods (i.e., temporary 
monopoly power). According to the author's [Wallsten, 2000] computations, granting a 
monopoly in fixed local service would more than double the price private investors pay 
for the firm. The advantage of exclusivity periods seen in the sale price comes at the cost 
of reducing network growth relative to privatization without exclusivity periods."l92 
Taking this into consideration and that South Africa's White Paper outlined the 
liberalization motives of government in the early 1990s, it is possible to locate South 
Africa in the liberal program of the emerging GIP regime193. It is equally important to 
recognise hegemonic stability theory as the theoretical framework that influenced South 
Africa's obligations, vis-a-vis international power relations, to participate in the emerging 
GIP regime. Operating on the periphery of global decision-making has provided South 
Africa with little hope of promoting its social -welfare aims. It therefore has to 
accommodate its vision for universal access in the framework of the electronic commerce 
approach that is driven by developed countries. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Bezzina and Sanchez (2005) pp. 46 
193 The second stage of the privatisation of Telkom commenced with the Initial Public Offering ofTelkom 
shares on the JSE Securities Exchange in South Africa and the New York Stock Exchange on 4 March 
2003. This has reduced the government's ownership of Telkom to 39.3% of the total ownership. Thintana 
LLC (consisting ofSBC and Telekom Malaysia) owns 30%, 27.7% is publicly owned and Ucingo owns 











The objectives of entering the infonnation economy and providing universal servIce 
indicates that South Africa's response is directed by the norms, rules and principles of the 
emerging GIP regime. Contributing to the importance of this emerging regime in 
international relations is its emphasis on infonnation policy. This study agrees with 
Braman's (2004) observation that there are three processes by which infonnation policy 
has emerged as a distinct issue area in which a regime is fonning: via a shift in 
perception, via empirical change, and via a change in political status. 194 All three 
contribute to the formation of a regime that makes infonnation policy an important field 
in international relations. For developing countries, there is optimism that the power 
balance in the international system might shift toward a less hierarchical structure that 
would include them in decision-making procedures. As the above study has documented, 
this optimism is conditional on a number of other factors in the international system that 
are extremely difficult to overcome. 
This study does not dispute that government has an important role to play in ensuring 
universal service, however its interference in the regulation of the sector has to be 
minimised so that the market can be competitive and contribute to the growth and scope 
of ICT in South Africa. Both social development and liberalization highlighted South 
Africa's eagerness to participate in the infonnation economy and provide access to the 
vast majority of its citizens. The outcomes were not positive, as many of the fears 
developing countries had when signing the WTO Agreement on Telecommunications 
manifested in the South African refonn period. The introduction of liberal refonns in an 
under-prepared environment, the high level of generality in the Reference Paper and 
domestic political intervention that obstructed the role of the regulator contributed to the 
stunted growth of South Africa's telecommunications sector. South Africa's response can 
therefore be attributed to its neoliberal commitments to the WTO and domestic politics. 











5.5 - Recommendations 
The twin objectives of entering the information economy and providing universal service 
indicate that South Africa's response is directed by the norms, rules and principles of the 
emerging GIP regime. The future of information policy entails greater liberalisation, 
however South Africa will have to fill the gaping holes in its policy implementation 
strategies. This study provides the following recommendations for international and 
domestic changes in the liberalisation of the WTO principles. 
• Government's role should not be separated from the process of liberalisation. 
Makhaya and Roberts (2003) frame this recommendation in a clear manner: "The 
policy regime therefore needs to take into account regulatory capabilities and the 
state continues to have a central, but changing, role to play in the extension of 
telecommunications servIces. There are no shortcuts the wider 
telecommunications service provision that is required for broad-based economic 
growth needs strong and effective government for its realisation.,,195 However, 
government's participation should not obstruct the important role played by the 
regulator in promoting competition in the sector; 
• The vertically integrated market structure opens up the opportunity for anti-
competitive behaviour and therefore needs to be restructured. Gillwald's (2005) 
suggestion that: "A market that is horizontally separated, through unbundling of 
the vertically integrated incumbent into its various components (network 
infrastructure, applications, services, and content) would be more likely to reduce 
incentives for non-competitive behaviour,,196, is in line with an alternative that 
this study poses to the current market structure. The market should therefore 
move toward the horizontally structured approach allowing for less regulation and 
problems with interconnection costs; 
• On an international level, flaws in multilateral agreements such as the WTO 
Agreement on Basic Telecommunications need to be addressed with input from 
developing countries. Privatisation is an important process for increased 
195 Makhaya and Roberts, (2003) pp. 58 











investment and development; however it needs have sequenced implementation 
schedules with the appropriate checks and balances in the domestic and 
international forums; and 
• Interconnection costs need to be carefully monitored by an independent regulator 
so that market entrants have the opportunity to participate in the sector and not be 
subject to high costs by the incumbent. 
Investigative TV -show, Carte Blanche, recently aired a feature on the problematic 
telecommunications sector in South Africa. When addressing government's shareholding 
structure in the monopoly operator, the Director-General of Communications repeatedly 
mentioned that its actions were "On behalf of the people of South Africa" 197. By 
protecting its R30 billion stake in the incumbent, its response to the emerging GIP regime 
has unfortunately alienated the people they were trying to help and plunged the sector 
into a hole that it is slowly trying to dig itself out of. This study anticipates that a rapid 
transition for South Africa's telecommunications industry is about to take place. With 
further privatization of Telkom on the horizon, the fonnulation of policy will be heavily 
influenced by the rapid innovation of ICT and the increasing domestic need for a strong, 
reliable network. The presence of the emerging GIP regime is growing stronger and it is 
only a matter of time before the regime demonstrates its utility as a means for 
international cooperation and shaping domestic policy for a functioning network society. 
197 "Telkom", Carte Blanche (9 April 2006) full transcript available on 
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ADDITIONAL COMMITMENTS BY SOUTH AFRICA 
REFERENCE PAPER 
The following are definitions and principles on the regulatory framework for the basic 
telecommunications services. 
Definitions 
Users mean service consumers and service suppliers. 
Essential facilities mean facilities of a public telecolmnunications transport network or 
service that: 
(a) Are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of suppliers; 
(b) Cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order to provide a service. 
A major supplier is a supplier which has the ability to materially affect the terms of 
participation (having regard to price and supply) in the relevant market for basic 
telecommunications services as a result of: 
(a) Control over essential facilities; or 
(b) Use of its position in the market. 
1. Competitive safeguards 
1.1 Prevention of anti-competitive practices in telecommunications 
Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers who, 
alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices. 
1.2 Safeguards 
The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall include in particular: 
(a) Engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization; 
(b) Using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results; and 
(c) Not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical information 
about essential facilities and commercially relevant information which are necessary for 












2.1 This section applies to linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications 
transport networks or services in order to allow the users of one supplier to 
communicate with users of another supplier and to access services provided by 
another supplier, where specific commitments are undertaken. 
2.2 Interconnection to be ensured 
Interconnection with a major supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible 
point in the network. Such interconnection is provided. 
(a) Under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including technical standards and 
specifications) and rates 198 and of a quality no less favourable than that provided for its 
own like services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers or for its 
subsidiaries or other affiliates; 
(b) In a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and 
specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, reasonable, having regard to 
economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for 
network components or facilities that it does not require for the service to be provided; 
(c) Upon request, at points in addition to the network tennination points offered to the 
majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of construction of necessary 
additional facilities; and 
2.3 Public availability of the procedures for interconnection negotiations 
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made publicly 
available. 
2.4 Transparency of interconnection arrangements 
It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available either its interconnection 
agreements or a reference interconnection offer. 
2.5 Interconnection: dispute settlement 
A service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have recourse, 
either: 
(a) At any time or 
(b) After a reasonable period of time which has been made publicly known to be an 
independent domestic body, which may be a regulatory body as referred to in paragraph 5 
below, to resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and rates for 
J98The authorities may detennine different rates in respect of different services rendered in different areas 
under different circumstances or may detennine rates which may be higher or lower than the nonnal rates 









interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to the extent that these have not been 
established previously. 
3. Universal service 
Any Member has the right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes to 
maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, provided they 
are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and 
are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the 
Member. 
4. Public availability oflicensing criteria 
Where a licence is required, all the licensing criteria and the tenns and conditions of 
individual licences will be made publicly available. 
The reasons for the denial of a licence will be made known to the applicant upon request. 
5. Independent regulators 
The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic 
telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall 
be impartial with respect to all market participants. 
6. Allocation and use of scarce resources 
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including frequencies, 
numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-
discriminatory manner. The current state of allocated frequency bands will be made 
publicly available, but detailed identification of frequencies allocated for specific 
government uses is not required. 












Prin,ipks for a Global Information So,iety 
en Brussels Principl6 for the Infonnation Society 
Promoting dynamic competition 
En,ouraging printe investment 
Defining an adaptabk regulatory framework 
Prc)\iding open access to networks 
II 'hilt' 
Ensuring universal prmisiol1 of an access to smiccs 
Promoting equality of opportunity to the citizen 
Promoting diwrsity of content, and 
RlXogniling the ne~l:ssity of worldwide co·opcmtioll 
Source: Braman (2003) pp. 141 
Gg:Devdoping World Principles for the Global 
Information Society 
lJ niversa I 5er\"~.l: 
Clear regulatory framework 
EmployTIlent ,'r~'lltion 
Global co"opemtion and competitiwn6s 
Diversity of applications and content 
Diversity of language and culture 
Cooperation in technology 
Privale investment and competition 
Prote,lion of intellectual property righl) 
Privacy and data slXurity 
Narrowing the infrastructure gap 












"The point of entry to participation in the e-economy and information society is the 
telecom network that provides both access to services and infonnation, and opportunities 
for participation. The productivity improvements and benefits that are actually realised by 
people, organisations and countries will depend upon how effectively these networks can 
be used. But those opportunities rest entirely on the telecom network foundation of the e-
economy - the coverage, access, quality, services and prices of the telecom network. 
South Africa's telecom network includes other players besides Telkom, and will include 
more in the future. It will require the contributions of many players to develop a complete 
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Proposal: Price Cap Regulation as a Test of Progress in South African Telecom Reform, 
and E-economy Development" in LINK Centre Policy Research Paper No 2, (University 
of Witwatersrand: LINK Centre) available on 
http://link.wits.ac.za/research/wm20021130.htm 
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